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COMMENT:
CONFLICTING VALUES: THE RELIGIOUS KILLING OF
FEDERALLY PROTECTED WILDLIFE*

INTRODUCTION

In our increasingly crowded world, the balancing of conflicting interests
between human beings can be very difficult. However, the balancing of
conflicting interests between humans and other species is far more difficult.The relationships between humans and animals, as joint tenants on
earth, are diverse and often contradictory.' Humans worship, love, and
admire animals; they also fear, hunt, and exploit animals. Relations between humans and animals are often defined by whether humans see their
interests as differing from those of animals.
When human beings do perceive their interests as conflicting with those
of animals, one of two philosophical perspectives generally will control
how the two interests are balanced.2 The first perspective values animals
according to their usefulness to humans.' The second perspective values
animals intrinsically, without regard for their utilitarian value to humans. 4
This perspective encompasses an emerging environmental ethic which
asserts that human beings should recognize moral and legal rights vested
both in nature and in animals. This Comment explores the current conflict
between federal wildlife protection and Indian religious use of animals
which reflects this philosophical debate.
*This comment received the 1990 Award for the Best Natural Resource Thesis, awarded by the
Natural Resource Section of the State Bar of New Mexico.
I. See generally K. Clark. Animals and Men (1977).
2. R. Nash, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental Ethics 4-10 (1989); Callicott. On
The Intrinsic Value Of Nonhuman Species, in The Preservation of Species 138 (B. Norton ed. 1986).
3. See generally D. Decker & G. Goff, Valuing Wildlife: Economic and Social Perspectives
(1987).
4. Frey, Rights. Interests, Desires and Beliefs, in People. Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic
Issues in Environmental Ethics 40 (1986); VanDeVeer, Interspecific Justice. in id. at 51.
5. Closely related to the idea of intrinsic rights of nature is the idea that those rights should be
legally enforceable. The best known proponent of legal standing for non-humans is University of
Southern California law professor Christopher Stone. During a protracted fight over the proposed
development of California's Mineral King area, Stone wrote a law review article timed to attract
the attention of Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?.
45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450 (1972). Justice Douglas adopted much of Stone's position in his Mineral
King dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting). Since
that time, Stone has responded to criticism in a subsequent article, Stone, Should Trees have Standing?
Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralistic Perspective. 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. I
(1985). Meanwhile, a tiny bird in Hawaii became an official plaintiff in Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of
Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the idea of legal
standing for nature and animals, see R. Nash. supra note 2, at 127.36.
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As legal conflicts between federal wildlife protection and individual
religious freedom multiply. it is increasingly apparent that courts have
no consistent standard by which to measure the relative merits of the two
interests. The infringement of individual religious practices raises issues
of constitutional significance under the First Amendment. Federal wildlife
protection, in turn, imposes strict prohibitions upon even the religious
killing of protected species.
Not only is the existing criteria for demonstrating a threshold burden
upon a religious practice vague and inconsistent, but if a religious practice
is found to be burdened, the requisite constitutional analysis involves a
balancing-of the relative interests without clear guidelines. Although the
legislative process provides the courts with some evidence of the weight
of the governmental interest in wildlife protection, constitutional analysis
of the right to free exercise of religion provides no principled means of
measuring the countervailing weight of Indian religious claims.
This current lack of clear standards is symptomatic of a more fundamental uncertainty about how conflicting interests are valued within our
society. This uncertainty is particularly acute in light of the deepening
global environmental crisis. Human beings are beginning to realize that
their well being and continued existence are intimately linked to the larger
deteriorating environment. As human populations multiply and increasingly deplete natural resources, the environment is showing alarming
signs of devastation, 6 from the pollution of air and water, to destruction
of the world's rainforests, loss of habitat, toxic contamination of lands,
overflowing landfills, and ozone depletion. These by-products of industrialization, individualism, and an emphasis on economic gain are the
logical consequences of the perspective that nature exists solely as a
resource to be utilized by humans. Internationally, both animals and plants
are proving unable to overcome these ecological disruptions, and are
vanishing at an unprecedented rate.7
The crisis, precipitated by a primarily utilitarian perspective and the
resulting estrangement of humans from nature, is now forcing a reevaluation of fundamental values. As one commentator concluded, "the pollution and destruction of man's environment are religious and ethical
problems that derive basically from irreverent and immoral attitudes toward nature, rather than from technological inadequacy alone. ' Some
commentators now warn that only a fundamental reassessment of values
can avert irreversible global deterioration.'
6. Barbour, Introduction, in Earth Might Be Fair. Reflections on Ethics, Religion, and Ecology
1 (1. Barbour ed. 1972).
7. VanDeVeer & Pierce, The Preservation of Species: Are They Special?, in People, Penguins,
and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics. supra note 4. at 107; see also. N. Myers,
The Sinking Ark: A New Look At The Problem Of Disappearing Species 4 (1979).
8. Schilling, The Whole Earth is The Lords,- in Earth Might Be Fair. Reflections On Ethics,
Religion, and Ecology 100 (1. Barbour ed. 1972).
9. Barbour, Introduction, supra note 6, at 1; N. Myers, supra note 7, at 14.
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As part of this reassessment, certain values inevitably will be reexamined. Individual rights necessarily will be weighed against the collective rights of larger communities. The short-term benefits of various
actions will be weighed against long-term consequences such as extinction. Economic interests, in turn, will be balanced against non-economic
interests.'" Any conduct, including religious practices, which may have
detrimental environmental impacts will be increasingly scrutinized.
Since time immemorial, animals have played an important role in
religious practices worldwide," from purely symbolic roles, to actual
animal sacrifices. Recent court cases in the United States demonstrate
that many immigrants continue to practice the animal sacrifices central
to the religions of their homelands.' Although most Indian religious
practices' 3 would not be characterized as animal sacrifices, many ceremonies do require eagle parts or entire eagle bodies, which necessitate
killing prior to the ceremonies."' Human beings who believe that animals
should be valued primarily for their usefulness to humans, may conclude
1O. For an interesting look at the economic view of wildlife, see Valuing Wildlife: Economic
And Social Perspectives (D. Decker & G. Goff, eds. 1987). For the most notable clash of economics
and wildlife preservation to date. see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978); and
see infra text accompanying notes 135-58.
II. See K. Clark. supra note I.at 13-22. Within the United States there are various religions
which use animals in religious ceremonies. For example, snake handling by the Holiness Church
of God in Jesus Name was enjoined by the Supreme Court of Tennessee upon finding: "handling
of snakes in a crowded church sanctuary with virtually no safeguards, with children roaming around
unattended, with the handlers so enraptured and entranced that they were in a virtual state of hysteria
required holding that defendants had combined and conspired to commit a public nuisance.. '"
State of Tenn. ex. rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 113 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied. 424 U.S.
954 (1976). In a footnote, the court noted that the founder of the religion, George Went Hensley,
was bitten four hundred times in the course of his ministry, and finally died as a result of a
diamondback rattlesnake bite during a prayer meeting at Lester's shed near Altha. Florida on July
24, 1955. Id. at 105 n.8.
12. In 1989. for example, a federal district court in southern Florida heard a free exercise claim
involving animal sacrifices. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, followers of
the Lukumi religion, also known as Santeria, claimed that a city ordinance violated their religious
right to sacrifice animals. 723 F.Supp. 1467 (S.D.Fla. 1989). Testimony established that there were
an estimated 50.000-60,000 Santeria practitioners in South Florida. Sacrifices included chickens.
pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea fowl, goats. sheep and turtles. The court found that the city had three
compelling secular interests: I) to prevent cruelty to animals; 2) to safeguard the health, welfare
and safety of the community; and 3) to prevent the adverse psychological effect on children exposed
to such sacrifices. Id. at 1477, 1485-87. Those interests were found to outweigh the religious free
exercise claim. Id. at 1487.
13. Although religious practices differ amongst various Indian tribes, the word "Indian" is used
in this Comment to include all tribes sharing the common characteristics discussed.
14. An exception to this general rule is the Hopi practice of taking eaglets from nests, which are
adopted into the tribe, fed by hand, and eventually sacrificed. J.Hughes, American Indian Ecology
36 (1983); H. Tyler, Pueblo Birds And Myths 52-55 (1979). According to Mr. Keith C. Frederick,
of the Department of the Interior, the Hopis hold the only permit ever granted under the religious
exception to the Eagle Protection Act to take live eagles. The permit is issued in the name of the
tribal chairman, for twelve golden eaglets annually. The permit, first issued in 1986, is reviewed
annually. Mr.Frederick stated that the taking of twelve eaglets is equivalent to taking approximately
six adults, since the mortality rate is about fifty percent. Interview with Mr. K.C. Frederick. Ass.
Special Agent in Charge, Division of Law Enforcement, Department of the Interior, Regional Office
in Albuquerque (Oct. 1989).
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that humans should have a legal right to take the life of an animal for
personal religious gratification. However, human beings who believe that

animals have inherent rights such as an interest in continued survival,
will conclude that humans have no right to subordinate the animal's ights
.to human religious desires. This debate constitutes the heart of the current
conflict between individual constitutional rights to religious use of animals
and government intervention on behalf of threatened species.

This Comment begins by examining the increasing federal preemption
of wildlife regulation. Three federal wildlife protection statutes are introduced, and the applicability of those statutes on Indian lands is discussed. The second section examines the current confusion surrounding
free exercise of religious standards. Finally, section three explores the
unresolved issue of how to balance the conflicting interests of Indian
religious use of animals with federal wildlife protection.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF FEDERAL WILDLIFE PROTECTION
A Disturbing Inaugural
Federal efforts to protect endangered wildlife made an inauspicious
debut in the 1870s as the American buffalo hovered on the brink of
extinction. The country was in the midst of an extended westward migration sparked by frontier dreams of inexhaustible land, abundant wildlife, and gold in California. " Wildlife was viewed primarily as existing
to serve the needs of human beings, and the virtually unrestricted freedom

to hunt was particularly exhilarating to recent immigrants from crowded
European homelands." It was an era when man measured his ability to
survive by his ability to dominate nature and bend it to human purposes.
When westward settlement began, at least forty million 7 buffalo roamed
the plains in enormous herds. In the slaughter that followed, individuals
asserted what they considered their unfettered right to kill wildlife, often
by shooting buffalo from moving trains for sport. "uScarcely thirty years
15. See generally J. Tober, Who Owns the Wildlife? The Political Economy of Conservation in
Nineteenth Century America 3-40 (1981). Although the California gold rush began in 1848, the
completion of the first transcontinental railroad in 1869 sparked a new interest in western migration.
16. Id. at 4-5. In England, for example, the right to hunt wildlife was often unevenly distributed
with landowners of the wealthier classes holding rights where less prosperous individuals were
barred. See T. Lund, American Wildlife Law 8-10 (1980).
17. Estimates vary on the original population numbers, with forty million a low estimate. See J.
Toer, supra note !5, at 97-102. For an exhaustive treatment of the subject of population estimates,
see F. Roe, The North American Buffalo 334-520 (1951) (186 pages discussing estimates).
18. Buffalo hunters often prided themselves on their trophy numbers. For instance, Buffalo Bill
Cody claimed he killed 4,280 buffalo in just a single twelve month period when he worked for
Union Pacific Railroad. P. Matthiessen, Wildlife in America 149 (1959). Some commentators believe
that it was the completion of the railroad which set in motion the "final frenzied assault upon the
buffalo." Id. at 148. Not only did the railroad allow unlimited target practice from moving trains,
it also created an unprecedented means of transporting hides to eastern markets. Id. at 149.
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later, nearly all of the forty million buffalo lay dead upon the plains, 9
with only an estimated twenty animals safe within the protected boundaries of the new Yellowstone National Park."
In 1874, while there was still time to intervene in this unprecedented
slaughter, Representative Greenbury Fort of Indiana introduced a buffalo
protection bill in the House of Representatives." The bill proposed to
"prevent the useless slaughter of buffalos within the territories" '22 and
provided stiff penalties for the killing of male buffalo except for food,
and prohibited the killing of female buffalo entirely. 3 The bill proposed
an express and unlimited exemption from liability for Indians."
Debate in the House of Representatives over the proposed bill revealed
not only most of the major positions on wildlife protection still taken
today, but also a chillingly candid record of early disagreement over
Indian exemptions from federal wildlife statutes.
While some congressmen lamented the slaughter of thousands of buffalo solely for their hides or their tongues, and hundreds of thousands
"without any object except to destroy them," ' other congressmen took
the unapologetic position that the extinction of the buffalo should be
encouraged as a means to force Indian tribes into economic and geographic
dependency. 26 In one of the darker moments of federal-Indian relations,
the Department of the Interior argued that Indians would not be civilized
until the buffalo were gone,27 and various congressmen endorsed the
government's perspective. 2
The debate also revealed a more fundamental human distrust of every19. Some historians estimate an annual kill of five million during the early 1870s. See J. Trefethen,
An American Crusade for Wildlife 15 (1975).
20. P. Matthiessen, supra note 18, at 150-51. The state of Wyoming established a ten year closed
season on the buffalo in 1890, and the twenty buffalo in Yellowstone slowly increased under that
protection. In 1908, the National Bison Range was established in Montana. The American Buffalo
narrowly escaped total extinction by the establishment of these limited reserves. Id. See also J.
Tober, supra note 15, at 97-102 for another detailed account of the decline from millions of buffalo
to a single herd of twenty animals.
21. Buffalo Protection Bill. H.R. 921, 43rd Cong., Ist Sess. 174 (serial set 1593) (1874).
22. 2 Cong. Rec. 2105 (1874).
23. Id. For a first offense, the proposed penalty was $100 per buffalo wounded or killed, and for
a second offense, a prison sentence of up to thirty days.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2106.
26. Id. at 2106-08.
27. Id. at 2106-09, see T. Lund. supra note 16, at 89 n. 85. The belief that destruction of the
buffalo would effectively destroy the Indian way of life was apparently well founded. In F.G. Roe's
detailed book on the buffalo, he notes that the independence of the Plains tribes was attributed to
the ease with which they could obtain food from the inexhaustible supply of buffalo. In examining
the relationship of Indians and buffalo, Roe further concludes **Iknow of no other instance throughout
the entire world wherein from one source so many commodities of primary importance were derived.'
F. Roe, supra note 17, at 602, 608. Another historian describes buffalo as the "beef, coal, iron,
plastic, cotton and wool of the Indian economy, all in one." J. Trefethen, supra note 19, at 8.
28. 2 Cong. Rec. 2106-08 (1874).
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thing perceived as wild and uncontrollable. ' Michigan Representative
Conger, for example, complained that buffalo "are as uncivilized as the
Indian" because they eat the grass, trample the plains, and destroy pastures. "" Representative Conger also argued the inevitable futility position, claiming that the bill was "utterly useless" because "there is no
law that Congress can pass that will prevent the buffalo disappearing
before the march of civilization." 3
To their credit, a majority of congressmen found the proposed policy
of extinction as a way to render the Indians more submissive to be a
"disgrace."32 Many were incredulous that other representatives favored
buffalo extinction as a means of forcing Indians into submission.33 Representative Hawley of Connecticut, for example, responded sharply:
As well you might bum the grass in [l]ndian country and around it
kill every bird, dig every root, destroy every animal whatever and
take away from the Indian the means of living, and in that way you
will perhaps be able to get them under your control, and be able to
board them at the Fifth Avenue Hotel and civilize them to your
satisfaction .... I object to the inhumanity of gentlemen who wish
to wipe out the buffalo in order to get the Indians upon reservations.'
Despite stiff opposition, the bill passed the House of Representatives
with 132 votes in support." The debate then moved to the Senate where
disagreement focused on whether Indians should be exempted from liability.' In response to a proposal to remove the Indian exemption, various
senators argued that not only did the Indians rely upon the buffalo for
food, but that the Indians were "careful and cautious" about the destruction of the buffalo.37 Representatives of the House agreed that "the Indian
never goes into a herd of buffalo and shoots them down out of mere
wanton wickedness. That is always done by white men. . ... , Supporters of the exemption finally overcame opposition, and the bill passed
the Senate on June 23, 1874. 3 '
29. Id. at 2106-07, 2109.
30. Id. at 2107; see also J. Tober, supra note 15, at 9, for evidence that the abhorance of
"uncivilized" Indians actually also extended to "uncivilized" white men. Tober cites a 1840 state
legislative report which declares, "so far as game and hunting are concerned, the sooner our wild
animals are extinct the better, for they serve to support a few individuals just on the borders of a
savage state ...." Id.
31. 2 Cong. Rec. 2107 (1874).
32. See. e.g., id. (Comments by Representative Eldredge of Wisconsin).
33. Id. at 2107-09.
34. Id. at 2107.
35. Id. at 2109. There is no recorded number voting in opposition; however, the full membership
of the House numbered 270 in 1874. Journal of the House of Representatives, 43rd Cong.. 1st Sets.
(serial set 1593) (1874).
36. 2 Cong. Rec. 5413-14 (1874).
37. Id. at 5413.
38. Id. at 2106.
39. Id. at 5414.
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The ultimate demise of the bill by President Grant's pocket veto, and
consequently of the wild buffalo itself, reflected an inauspicious debut
for federal wildlife regulation. While the eventual loss of wild buffalo
herds was arguably inevitable in the face of increasing settlement,' the
failure of Congress to overcome the presidential veto demonstrated the
ineffective early attempts to afford federal wildlife protection.
After presidential veto of the Buffalo Protection Act, a few states made
an effort to stem the slaughter,4 ' but due to the broad migration patterns
of buffalo, only federal nationwide protection could have been effective.
Nearly one hundred years later, passage of the Endangered Species Act
of 197342 would reverse this ineffective federal role, but the eventual
assertion of federal power would come too late to save the wild buffalo.43
Federal Authority to Regulate Wildlife
The premise that the United States government should concern itself
with the well being of wild animals emerged very slowly in American
law. Despite the harsh conditions of settlement life, ,wildlife was abundant
and easily satisfied the needs of a sparse human population." Consequently, the federal government had little incentive to test the scope of
its constitutional authority to preempt local regulation of wild animals.
There could have been exceptions for birds and animals such as buffalo,
whose broad migratory patterns suggested that state regulation would be
ineffective. However, more urgent matters preoccupied the federal government during consideration of the Buffalo Protection Bill in the extended
aftermath of the Civil War. A wildlife population crisis probably paled
in contrast to many of the problems which confronted the early Congress.
As a result, recognition of a unique need for federal protection of migratory species did not occur until the early twentieth century. '5
In the colonies and on the frontier, a hands-on rule defined an individual's legal right to kill wildlife. Early settlers applied the doctrine of
capture,' borrowed from the English common law of property under
which wild animals became the private property of an individual upon
40. P. Matthiessen, supra note 18, at 151.
41. Colorado and Kansas, for instance, enacted protective laws in 1875, but by then there were
few remaining buffalo within their territories. J. Trefethen, supra note 19, at 16.
42. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
43. From the twenty buffalo in Yellowstone National Park at the turn of the century, other reserves
were eventually created to maintain small controlled herds. P. Matthiessen, supra note 18. at 151.
While the wild buffalo escaped near extinction as a species, the buffalo of today live a semidomesticated life. New reserves are still being created; the Nature Conservancy recently purchased
30,000 acres in Oklahoma to re-establish a prairie ecosystem, and reintroduce a herd of bison. Eds.,
News, Wildlife Conservation 18 (Mar/Apr 1990).

44. J. Tober. supra note 15, at 3.
45. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
46. See Pierson v. Post. 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 52223 (1896). For a general discussion of the historical relationship between royal ownership rights of
wild animals and those of individuals, see J.Tober. supra note 15. at 146-47.
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capture or physical possession. Individuals hunted with few restraints,
particularly on an individual's own private property.4 What minimal state
regulations existed usually sought to regulate the taking of game to achieve
a sustained yield or stable population by periodic closed seasong. Many
years would pass before the federal government would test its authority
to intervene in wildlife matters and preempt the previously unquestioned
authority of the state. Meanwhile, both the power and the incentive of
the federal government to regulate wildlife lay dormant.
In 1896, the United States Supreme Court turned its attention to the
ruffled grouse of Connecticut and fundamentally altered the legal principles which governed early wildlife law. In Geer v. Connecticut,9 the
Supreme Court decisively endorsed two principles: first, that state regulation of wildlife is subject to constitutionally vested federal rights,'
and second, that ownership of wildlife is collective, with the government
acting in a trustee capacity.' In affirming a Connecticut law prohibiting
the shipment of any game birds out of the state, the Court concluded that
the common ownership right vested in a sovereign included the right to
keep the property within its jurisdiction. 2 With the assertion of federal
authority under the Commerce Clause still dormant,"3 the Court found
that the state prohibition of interstate commerce lay outside the scope of
Commerce Clause concerns.' However, while the Court strengthened
state authority vis-a-vis its citizens by the doctrine of state trusteeship of
wildlife, it also stated that state authority is recognized where it is not

"incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the Federal
government by the constitution.""
The holding in Geer signaled a significant limitation of an individual's
previously unfettered right to take wildlife, and laid, the theoretical framework for increasing both federal and state restrictions on individual rights.
The Court explicitly found ihat individuals have no right to hunt wildlife,
but may be accorded the privilege to do so according to terms set by the

state sovereign.' Because the sovereign serves as trustee for all citizens'
interests in wildlife, the Court concluded that the state acts under a duty
47. Geer v. Connecticut. 161 U.S. 519. 523 (1896).

48. For a detailed history of state game laws and their goals, see generally, J. Tober, supra note
15. at 139.
49. 161 U.S. 519.
50. Id. at 528.

51. Id. at 529. 534. The Court noted that this finding builds upon its earlier finding in Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 420 (1842) that wildlife ownership is held in common by citizens,
and vested in their sovereign. Id. at 529.
52. Id. at 530.

53. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 404-08 (2d ed. 1988).
54. Geer. 161 U.S. at 531-32.
55. Id.at 528.

56. Id. at 533.

Summer 19901

RELIGIOUS KILLING OF PROTECTED

WILDLIFE

to regulate consistent with that trust, 7 even after an individual secures
physical possession of the animal.'
Because the rationale of Geer rested upon a now outdated concept of
the scope of federal authority under the Commerce Clause, it was inevitable that Geer eventually would be overturned. In Hughes v. Oklahoma,," the Supreme Court described Geer as eroded to the point of
virtual extinction' and held that state obstruction of wildlife entering
interstate commerce was an impermissible restraint under the Commerce
Clause." Despite Geer's ultimate reversal in recognition of federal supremacy, the basic concept of governmental units as wildlife trustees
dominated early development of wildlife law in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.'
Just four years after Geer, the Lacey Act of 1900 initiated federal
intervention in the regulation of wildlife, prohibiting the interstate transport of any animal killed in violation of state law.6 Despite the fact that
the Lacey Act is considered an early, tentative assertion of federal authority, it is still utilized today. For example, poachers are being prosecuted under the Lacey Act for the killing of American black bears to fill
an Asian demand for bear gall bladders.' Although some courts interpreted the Lacey Act's continued deference to state regulation as confirming relinquishment of federal authority, that interpretation proved
inaccurate with the subsequent enactment of increasingly assertive federal
wildlife statutes.61
THE WILDLIFE TRILOGY

In 1918, the federal government began a p6licy-of expanding intervention in wildlife protection. As federal intervention increased and grew
more stringent, individual freedom to take wildlife for any purpose became subject to increasing regulation. There are three federal statutes
which have primarily precipitated continual conflict between federal wildlife protection and individual religious use of wildlife: the Migratory Bird
57. Id. at534.
58. Id. at 533.
59. 441 U.S. 322 (1979); for a general discussion of the erosion of the state ownership doctrine,
see J. Tober, supra note 15, at 161-65.
60. Hughes. 441 U.S. at 332.
61. Id. at 337.
62. See M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law, 16-36 (2d. ed. 1983).
63. Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§42-44 (1988) and 16
U.S.C. § 701 (1988)). Prior to the Lacey Act, there were only a handful of relatively insignificant
efforts by the federal government. See generally M. Bean, supra note 62, at 14.

64. Nobbe, Sonebody's KillingOur Bears: The Korean Connection, in Wildlife Conservation 48
(JanlFeb, 1990).

65. M. Bean, supra note 62, at 18.
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Treaty Act' of 1918, the Bald Eagle Protection Act6' of 1940, and the
Endangered Species Act" of 1973.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act
The earliest of the three statutes, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),
is also the most recent to come under constitutional challenge.' Although
the act represents an early congressional effort to comply with international treaty obligations,' today it still remains a viable means of affording
migratory birds federal protection." Perceived as a necessary response
to declining bird populations, the act prohibits the taking, killing, possession, sale, or offer for sale of any bird listed under various treaties,
absent approval by regulation or permit.' The act provides for both
misdemeanor and felony criminal convictions, but only commercial activities involving protected birds give rise to felony charges, with fines
of up to $2,000 and two years of imprisonment." The felony provisions
were amended in 1986 to require knowledge as an element of the crime.'
In 1920, the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland upheld the constitutionality of MBTA, finding federal authority to regulate wildlife pursuant to its treaty making power." In so holding, the Court signaled the
beginning of significant erosion of Geer's state ownership doctrine as a
bar to federal regulation. The Court noted that while a state's authority
66. 16 U.S.C. §§703-15 (1988).

67. 16 U.S.C. §§668-668d 1988).
68. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
69. United States v. Hinds. No. 89-46 (D.N.M. Jan. 19. 1990).
70. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
71, For an extremely stringent enforcement of MBTA. see United States v. Richards. 583 F.2d
491 (10th Cir. 1978). In Richards. a college professor "-ofgood reputation and high community
standing" who was convicted of selling three sparrow hawks, received three concurrent terms of
eighteen months imprisonment for a first offense. Id. ai.497.
The MBTA replaced the initial Migratory Bird Act of 1913, which had triggered a small flurry
of constitutional attacks by its declaration that all takings of migratory and insectivorous birds were
subject to federal regulation. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 145, 37 Stat. 828 (repealed 1918). For
constitutional attacks, see United States v. Shauver. 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal dismissed,
248 U.S. 594 (1919); United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). In those cases, the
United States unsuccessfully defended its regulatory authority as constitutionally derived from both
the Property Clause and the Commerce Clause; both courts found that under Geer, the states had
the superior regulatory right. See M. Bean, supra note 62, at 19-20. The Property Clause was later
found to be a valid basis for federal wildlife regulation in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529
(1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled
on the issue, commentators believe the Commerce Clause provides an alternative basis. See M.
Bean, supra note 62, at 26.
72. 16 U.S.C. §703 (1988).
73. 16 U.S.C. §707(b) (1988).
74. Pub. L. 99-645, Title
V. §501, 100 Star. 3590 (codified as amended at16 U.S.C. § 707(b)
(1988)). The felony provision was likely
amended inresponse to a 1985 Sixth Circuit opinion holding
the provision in violation of due process because itdid not require scienter.-See United States v.
Wuliff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th Cir. 1985).
75. U.S. Const. art.
I1,
§2; see Missouri v.Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
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may be superior as between the state and its citizens, it does not follow
that state authority is exclusive. 6 In finding that wild birds are not in the
ownership nor even the possession of the states, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, writing for the Court, concluded that a fleeting presence of
migratory birds within a state does not warrant exclusive state authority
to regulate them."
As a statute enacted to implement the provisions of various treaties,
MBTA contains no statutory exceptions. However, various exemptions
do appear in specific treaties, typically allowing for subsistence takings
by Eskimos and Indians. 7 Of particular importance to Indian tribes, eagles
first received federal protection pursuant to the 1936 convention between
the United States and Mexico.' In 1972, the entire Accipitridae family,
which includes all eagles and hawks, received identical protection.'
Bald Eagle Protection Act
The second major federal statute currently involved in constitutional
challenges is the Bald Eagle Protection Act (BEPA, after 1962: EPA).'
It is not surprising that eagles were the first animals to warrant individual
statutory protection under the fledgling federal laws. Eagles carry special
significance for many peoples of North America, symbolizing both power
and freedom. Not only are eagles considered sacred in native Indian
cultures,8 but the bald eagle is the national bird of the United States 3
and the golden eagle is the national bird of Mexico. s" The bald eagle,
for example, is described in the enacting clause of BEPA as "a symbol
of the American ideas of freedom."85
76. 252 U.S. at 434.
77. M. Bean, supra note 62, at 21.
78. Exceptions appear in various treaties. For example, the 1916 Canadian Convention excepts
the taking of birds by Eskimos and Indians for food and clothing. Convention for the Protection of
Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916. United States-Great Britain (on behalf of Canada), 39 Star. 1702,
1703, T.S. No. 628. In contrast, the Mexican convention contains no such exception. See Convention
for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936. United States-Mexico,
50 Star. 1311, T.S. No. 912.
79. The United States.Mexico Convention of 1936 provided for later inclusion of migratory birds
at the request of the Presidents of both nations. Id.
80. On March 10. 1972, by diplomatic notes, the entire family of Accipitridae was added. 37
Fed. Reg. 22,633 (1972).
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1988). The statute was referred to as BEPA until the 1962 amendments, when the golden eagle was added. The provision's official title now is Protection of Bald
and Golden Eagles, and it is now referred to as EPA, for Eagle Protection Act.
82. See generally E. Parsons, Pueblo Indian Religion (1939); G. Reichard, I Navajo Religion:
A Study of Symbolism (1950); I. Tyler, Pueblo Birds and Myths (1979).
83. In Pueblo Birds and Myths, the author notes that the choice of the bald eagle as the symbol
of the United States is a curious one because the bald eagle is a carrion eater, robs weaker birds
such as ospreys of their catches, and is cowardly in contrast to the golden eagle. H. Tyler, supra
note 14, at 48.
84. 5 Encyclopedia Britanica, Miropaedia 340 (15th ed. 1987).,
85. 16 U.S.C. 1668 (1988).
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Because many Indian tribes consider eagles sacred, prosecutions under
BEPA resulted in the majority of Indian free exercise of religion defenses
to date. Simultaneously, prosecutions under BEPA raised questions regarding the continued viability of existing Indian treaty hunting rights.
The conflict between eagle protection and Indian religious rights intensified when the golden eagle was also brought within federal protection.
As originally enacted in 1940, BEPA afforded federal protection only to
bald eagles." In 1962, protection was extended to golden eagles,' both
to better protect young bald eagles who are difficult to distinguish from
golden eagles," and in response to declining populations."
Congressional House debate surrounding the 1962 amendments took
particular notice of the fact that the golden eagle is "important in enabling
many Indian tribes, particularly those in the southwest, to continue ancient
customs and ceremonies that are of deep religious or emotional significance to them."' Similarly the Department of the Interior observed that
"the eagle, by reason of its majestic, solitary, and mysterious nature,
became an especial object of worship. ...

The mythology of almost

every tribe is replete with eagle beings.""' Congress concluded that with
the addition of golden eagles to BEPA an exception should be created
for Indian religious use.' 2 Pursuant to that statutory authority, the Department of Interior promulgated regulations creating a permit process
for Indians to obtain eagles for religious use, primarily through receipt
of dead eagles already in the possession of the federal government. 3 Both
the permit system and recent constitutional challenges to its provisions
are discussed in detail below.
The Bald Eagle Protection Act represents a significant further assertion
of federal regulatory power. The act makes it a federal crime to take,
possess, sell, purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport,
export, or import bald or golden eagles, or any part, nest or egg of an
eagle." In contrast to the MBTA, BEPA does not distinguish commercial
activities by assigning higher penalties to selling protected birds, nor does
it provide for felony convictions." Since its enactment, Congress sub86. Act of June 8, 1940, Pub. L. No. 567, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250.
87. Act of Oct. 24, 1962. Pub. L. No. 87.884, 76 Stat. 1246 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §668).
88. The immature bald eagle is not marked with the characteristic white head and tails. See S.
Rep. No. 1986. 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1962).
89. H. Rep. No. 1450, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962).
90. Id. at 6.
91. S. Rep. No. 1986, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1962).
92. Id. at 2.
93. 50 C.F.R. §22.22 (1988).
94. 16 U.S.C. §668 (1988),
95. Id.; see MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
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stantially amended BEPA twice, in 1962 and in 1972, 9' making the
penalties more severe and providing for various exceptions from liability."
Significantly, the 1972 amendments also lowered the liability threshold
by providing that "wanton disregard for the consequences of his act"
could substitute for "intent to kill" under BEPA. 9
During the 1972 congressional debate, the Department of the Interior
revealed that only 32 federal convictions had been obtained under the act
in the previous five years, with violators averaging a $50 fine per incident.' Congress responded by increasing criminal penalties to $5,000
and/or one year's imprisonment for first offenders, and $10,000 and/or
two years' imprisonment for second offenders.°' Congress also added
civil penalties of $5,000 per violation for the first time. " The Senate
also took congressional notice of the continued killing of eagles by ranchers and farmers, who sometimes destroyed large numbers by aerial shooting.' 0 3 As a result, Congress designed a penalty designed to strike fear
into the heart of ranching country: the cancellation of grazing rights." 4
To encourage enforcement, an innovative citizen enforcement incentive
provision provided for payment of one-half of any fine up to $2,500 to
any person giving information leading to a conviction under the act." 5
The Endangered Species Act
The third federal wildlife statute to trigger constitutional challenges is
the Endangered Species Act of 1973"'° (ESA). This act represents the
culmination of increasingly stringent federal protection, and is described
by the United States Supreme Court as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
nation." 0 7 The act is also described as the "strongest legal expression to
date of environmental ethics.""° In enacting the ESA, Congress signaled
96. Act of Oct. 24. 1962. Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §668).
97. Act of Oct. 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-535, 86 Stat. .1064 (currently codified at 16 U.S.C.

§668).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. S. Rep. 1159. 92d Cong., 2d 5ess. reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
4285, 4288.
101. 16 U.S.C. §668.
102. 16 U.S.C. §668(b).
103. Senate Report supra note 100. U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4287-88.
104. 16 U.S.C. §668(c).
105. 16 U.S.C. §668(a).
106. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1543 (3988).
107. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153. 180 (1978) (hereinafter TVA).
108. R. Nash. supra note 2, at 175.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

a definitive end to an era.' Never again would wildlife in America be
viewed as an inexhaustible resource to be carelessly harvested. Simultaneously, in 1973, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species went into effect, providing for international enforcement of trade
prohibitions of endangered species and their products."'
The Endangered Species Act mandates a comprehensive, integrated
approach to the preservation of vanishing species. Not only does the ESA
restrict the taking of species listed as threatened or endangered, but it
regulates both domestic and international trade, provides for the protection
and acquisition of habitat necessary to ensure species survival, and mandates federal agencies to act consistently with the protections afforded
under the act."' As one commentator concludes, the ESA embodies the
legal idea that a "listed nonhuman resident of the United States is guaranteed, in a special sense, life and liberty. '"t'
The Endangered Species Act is also an interesting hybrid of the two
prevalent perspectives on man's relationship to nature. The act's statement
of purpose reflects the classic utilitarian perspective, declaring that endangered species are "of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.'' 3 Yet
protection under the act is not limited to species of use to humans. All
species "listed" as endangered or threatened are afforded protection, and
utility to humans is not a criteria for listing."" Taken as a whole, the
ESA reflects an implied endorsement of the intrinsic value perspective.
The ESA replaced two earlier statutes designed to protect endangered
species: the Endangered Species Act of 1966," s which was fatally flawed
by its weak recommendation to federal agencies to protect endangered
species "insofar as practicable"; and the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969,Y6 which focused primarily on the identification of
109. D. Rohlf, The Endangered Species Act 1 (1989).
110. By 1980. 51 nations had joined the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES). CITES completely prohibits international trade in the 600 most endangered species and
their products. It also requires export licenses for another 200. Countries which are not signatories
to the convention, however, are not bound, P. & A. Ehrlich, Extinction 194 (1981).
I1l. See M. Bean. supra note 62. at 330-41.
112. J. Petulla, American Environmentalism: Values, Tactics. Priorities 51(1980).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(3) (1988).
114. Id. at § 1533.
115. Pub. L. No. 89-669, §§ 1-3. 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed by 87 Stat. 903 (1973)). The
1966 act did take the important step of declaring the preservation of endangered species to be a
national policy. While the act encouraged consideration of impacts on endangered species. the act
did not prohibit the taking of an endangered plant or animal (still deferring to state authority). Only
on federal lands was some degree of protection afforded. however, even there it was qualified by
the authority given to the Secretary of the Interior to allow hunting of even endangered species.
116. Pub. L. No. 91-135. 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed by 87 Stat. 903 (1973)). This act was
limited in that it focused on international aspects; protection was extended only to species which
were in danger of extinction worldwide. Positive aspects were the provisions for identifying species
worldwide who were at risk, and the implementing of import-export bans.
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endangered species worldwide and import-export bans. By 1973, it was
apparent that the existing statutory protections were ineffective and that
the pace of species extinction appeared to be accelerating." 7 The Assistant
Secretary of the Interior reported to Congress that "half of the recorded
extinctions of mammals over the past 2000 years have occurred in the
most recent 50 year period.""' 8 Congressional attention focused on this
accelerated loss and on the incalculable value of genetic diversity. ,
Following hearings, Congress concluded that the two major causes of
extinction were hunting and the destruction of natural habitats. 20
The final version of the ESA suffered from none of the timid language
characteristic of previous acts. The act orders, without qualification, all
persons and federal agencies to act in the interest of preserving endangered
species."' The taking" 2 of any species listed as endangered is prohibited,
subject to statutory exemptions. The ESA established two levels of listing
for species placed within the act: 1) threatened species which are likely
to become endangered within the foreseeable future, and 2) endangered
species which are in danger of extinction."'2 Currently, bald eagles are

listed as endangered,' 24 while golden eagles are not on either list."
The exemptions created in the statute are extremely narrow in contrast
to earlier conservation acts."" The only Indian exemption is for subsis2 The exemption protence takings,' 27 and is only applicable in Alaska."'
are Alaskan Natives
who
Eskimos
or
Aleuts
by
Indians,
takings
vides that
permanent
non-native
made
by
residing in Alaska, or subsistence takings
residents of Alaska native villages, are excepted from liability.'2 - In a
!17. H. Rep. No. 412, 93rd Cong., IstSess. 4 (1973).

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. S. Rep. No. 307, 93rd Cong., IstSess. 2 (1973).
121, See TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
122. "Taking" is broadly defined in ESA to include harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound.
kill, trap, capture, collect, or attempt to engage in such conduct. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(14) (1988). For
litigation interpreting the meaning of "taking" under ESA, see Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land &
Natural Resources (Palila II), 852 F2d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 1988); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of
Land & Natural Resources (Palia 1), 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Froehlke,
534 F.2d 1289, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1976).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) & (20) (1988).
124. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1988). The bald eagle. Haliaeetus leucocephalus, is currently listed as
endangered in "North America south to northern Mexico." Excepted from the listing are the following
states: Washington, Oregon, Minnesota. Wisconsin. and Michigan. Four other eagles share endangered specie status: the white-tailed Greenland eagle, the harpy eagle of South America. the monkeyeating eagle of the Philippines, and the Spanish Imperial eagle of Spain. Morocco, and Algeria.
125. Golden eagles are not listed as threatened under ESA. See 50 C.FR. § 17.11 (1988).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1988).
127. Subsistence is defined within the exemption provision to include selling any edible portion
of fish or wildlife in native villages or towns in Alaska for native consumption within the native
village or town. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(eX3Xi) (1988).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1988).
129. Id.
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unique provision, the exemption also provides that in conjunction with
a subsistence taking, "authentic native articles of handicrafts and clothing" may be made or sold from the non-edible portions." ° Consistent

with the overall stringent nature of the statute, even this exemption remains subject to a determination by the Secretary of the Interior that if
such taking will "materially and negatively affect the threatened or endangered species," it may be regulated or restricted. 3'
Legislative history reveals that Congress considered but rejected a
religious use exemption for Indians residing in the lower states,' 32 after
reviewing a list of endangered species submitted by the Department of
Interior identifying 65 birds, 26 mammals, 21 fish, and 7 reptiles whose
habitats include Indian lands.' The bald eagle and the Florida panther,
which appeared on that original list, have subsequently both been the
subject of litigation over Indian takings."
Economic Development vs. A Very Small Fish
Because the ESA adopts as a national public policy "to halt and reverse
the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost,"'3 3 a legal challenge on economic grounds was inevitable. In the confrontation, representing endangered species was a three inch minnow, described by Tennessee
Representative John Duncan as inedible, slimy, and not much to look
at." 6 When Representative Duncan later resorted to congressional tactics
130. Id.
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(4) (1988).
132. In 1972, Congress considered, but rejected two alternative drafts of the proposed Endangered
Species Act (H.R. 13081, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3199, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972)). The
two unpassed bills contained exemptions for the taking of protected species for Indian religious
purposes, pursuant to a treaty, executive order or statute. In congressional hearings, the Department
of the Interior argued for inclusion of an exception for "ritual" use by American Indians, Aleuts,
and Eskimos. but the recommendation was rejected. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972:
Hearings on S. 249. S. 3199, and S. 3818 before the Subcommittee on the Environment of the Senate
Committee on Commerce. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 66. 71 (1972).
133. The list was presented by Nathaniel P. Reed of the Department of the Interior. Predatory
Mammals and Endangered Species: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1972). There were separate lists for mammals, birds, reptiles, and fishes.
The listed mammals, for example included: Indiana bat, spotted bat, Utah prairie dog, Northern
Rocky Mountain wolf, Eastern timber wolf, red wolf, San Joaquin kit fox, grizzly bear, blackfooted ferret. Florida panther, Eastern cougar, Columbia white-tailed deer, Sonoran pronghorn,
California bighorn, peninsular bighorn, Arizona prairie dog, dog-eared kangaroo rat. Florida water
rat or round-tailed muskrat, northern swift fox, pine marten, Sierra red fox, fisher, Everglades mink.
wolverine, and Canadian lynx. Id. at 143.
134. Id. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (bald eagle); United States v. Billie,
667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (Florida panther); United States v. Frybarg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th
Cir. 1980) (bald eagle).
135. TVA, 437 US. at 184.
136. Endangered Species Hearings: House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment 95th Cong., 2d Ses. 54
(1978) (statement of Representative John Duncan of Tennessee).
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which could also be described as "slimy," ' the impression probably
became a mutual one. Representing man's economic interests was a
virtually completed dam, which by most accounts already represented an
enormous economic investment. In what was to become a bitter and
divisive dispute reaching all the way to President Carter's Cabinet, the
new federal policy was put to the test.
The dispute began on deceptively simple facts. One hundred sixteen
million dollars 3 " had already been spent toward completion of the Tellico
Dam by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). When University of
Tennessee zoologist David Etnier discovered 3 ' a unique "snail darter"
minnow living in an area scheduled to be flooded, opponents of the Tellico
Dam project saw an opportunity to challenge its completion.'" Efforts
began to get the tiny snail darter officially listed as endangered under the
ESA and to have the Little Tennessee River declared its critical habitat;
both efforts were to prove successful.'" Meanwhile, TVA frantically
began an incubation program with an eye to transplanting baby snail
darters, which ultimately proved a dismal failure." 2 Simultaneously, TVA
unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to
"delist" the location as the critical habitat, on the dubious theory that
since partial construction of the dam had already blocked access to the
snail darter's breeding area, the species was already doomed." 3
The snail darter then became the best known obscure species on earth,
as dam opponents took their fight into the courts via the citizens' suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act.'" Following a controversial
trial, the district court dismissed the complaint, citing the near completion
of the dam and the. fact that enactment of the ESA occurred after initiation
of the project. ", The Sixth Circuit reversed, and ordered the district court
to enjoin work on the* dam.' As both sides scrambled to prepare for
arguments before the Supreme Court, the case became a bitter issue within
President Carter's Cabinet. Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus staunchly
supported upholding the Endangered Species Act, while Attorney General
Griffin Bell opposed it and claimed it was his right to file a brief in favor
of TVA as the official government position."" When the justices of the
137. For a description of the devious tactics of Representative Duncan, see infra text accom-

panying note 156.
138. Estimates vary; the Supreme Court noted that district court estimates were approximately
$131 million. TVA. 437 U.S. at 166.
139. W. Wheeler & M. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam.-936-1979: A Bureaucratic Crisis
in Post-industrial America 156-57, 185, 188-89 (1986).
140. Id. at 185-96.
141. j/d. at 191-96.
142. Id. at 196.
143. Id. at 198.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988).
145. 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); see TVA, 437 U.S. at 153 (for a sequential history).
146. 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
147. W. Wheeler & M. McDonald. supra note 139, at 205.
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United States Supreme Court finally gathered to decide the fate of both
the snail darter and possibly the Endangered Species Act itself, at least
one justice was reportedly furious to find two diametrically opposed
government briefs.'"
On June 15, 1977, by a five to three margin, the Court announced that
the Endangered Species Act prohibited the impoundment of the Little
Tennessee River by the Tellico Dam."" Citing the clear congressional
intent that Congress intended "to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, at whatever cost,""
the Court upheld the new and uncom5
promising public policy. ' 1
Followilig the decision, a frustrated Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee set about to find his constituent TVA a way out. He successfully
secured an amendment to ESA which created a seven member committee
of federal officials authorized to grant exemptions from ESA.' 2 However,53
Senator Baker's frustration returned when the newly appointed "God"'
committee unanimously refused to grant TVA an exemption. '3 A furious
Senator Baker then unsuccessfully tried to abolish the committee."' Finally, in a rather devious move, TVA supporter, Tennessee Representative
John Duncan first got an exemption attached as a rider to a public works
appropriation bill, then managed to get the bill passed unread by a "nearly
empty" House of Representatives. ' The Senate, already alerted by this
tactic, first rejected, but ultimately passed the bill by a four vote margin,
despite President Carter's lobbying for rejection."" President Carter reluctantly signed the bill on September 25, 1977, signaling a victory of
economics over the protection of endangered species.'"
The lessons from the snail darter controversy are mixed. On one hand,
the judicial process validated the dramatically stringent new federal policy. On the other hand, economic development proponents showed they
could evade the act when necessary. However, Congress has continued
its support of the statutory mandate of ESA; for example, by amendment
in 1988, penalties were increased to $25,000 for most civil offenses and
$50,000 for most criminal offenses.' 5
148. Justice Powell was reportedly "more than irritated. "Id. at 208.
149. TVA. 437 US. 153.
150. Id. at 184. However, Justice Powell stated that he expected Congress to amend ESA in
response to the TVA holding, to prevent grave economic consequences. TVA. 437 U.S. at210
(Powell, J. dissenting).
151. Id. at 195.
152. W. Wheeler & M. McDonald, supra note 139, at 208.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 211.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 212.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 213.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1988), as amended by 100 Pub. L. 478, at 1006; 102 Stat. 2306 (1988).
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STATUTORY APPLICABILITY ON INDIAN LANDS

Indian Treaty Rights: Implied Abrogation?
With the enactment of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Bald Eagle
Protection Act, and the Endangered Species Act, the taking and possession
of various animals and birds became prohibited on Indian lands for the
first time. These progressively more stringent federal statutes not only
restricted general hunting and fishing, but also restricted the taking of
animals for religious purposes. After Congress rejected broad exemptions
for Indian takings of protected animals,"w the issue arose whether existing
treaty rights shielded Indians from liability. With the extension of federal
protection to golden eagles under the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 6' prosecutions of Indians increased dramatically.t62 In the litigation that followed, most Indian defendants argued that under various treaties their
right to hunt and fish was guaranteed. Because none of the three statutes
contains any provision which explicitly abrogates existing treaty rights,
courts are forced to decide whether treaty hunting rights are abrogated
by implication.
Historically, the United States obtained vast tracts of land by entering
into treaties with Indian tribes.' 63 In exchange for relinquishing land,
Indians received various "rights" and "benefits." Recognition of tribal
hunting and fishing rights on reservation lands was one of the most
fundamental of treaty provisions.'" Hunting provisions are considered so
fundamental to treaty rights that they are often implied where there is no
express treaty provision.'"
Indian tribes occupy a -unique position in the legal framework of the
United States. Tribes are both recognized as sovereign entities on an equal
footing, with states," and simultaneously as sovereigns who are subject
to the plenary power of the federal government. 67 Despite the fact that
160. Predatory Mammals and Endangered Species: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fish.
eries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1972).
161. Act of Oct. 24. 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-884. 76 Stat. 1246 (currently codified at 16 U.S.C.

p668).
162. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979);
United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); United
States v. L. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. C. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. White, 508 F.2d*453 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Abeyta. 632 F.
Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986); United States v. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D.
Nev. 1986). afrd. 829 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Allard. 397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mon.
1975); see generally Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal Wildlife Law. 31
Stan. L. Rev. 375 (1979).
163. Treaty making ended in 1873. pursuant to the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3. 1873,
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 33 (1942).
164. D. Getches & C. Wilkinson. Federal Indian Law 718 (1986).
165. See. e.g.. United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. 1485. 1488-89 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
166. Coggins & Modftin, supra note 162, at 383.
167. Id. at 379; D. GCtches & C. Wilkinson. supra note 164, at 269.
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states are theoretically restrained in their authority to regulate Indian
matters by virtue of tribal sovereignty, states are allowed to regulate some
aspects of Indian hunting rights. The scope of state authority to regulate
Indian hunting and fishing rights now appears to be extremely broad. In
a 1973 case involving state regulation of'Indian fishing rights, '" Supreme
Court Justice William 0. Douglas indicated that when species populations
are declining, state regulation even to the point of prohibition would be
permissible:
We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very
last steelhead in the river. Rights can be controlled by the need to
conserve a species; and the time may come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream that all fishing should be
banned until the species regains assurance of survival. The police
power of the State isadequate to prevent the steelhead from following
the fate of the passenger pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the
Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until itenters
their nets.I' 6
With increasing regularity authority recognized in states, and with the
progressive entry of the federal government into the field of wildlife
regulation, Indians now face even more formidable challenges to their
existing treaty rights. Indian defendants charged with the taking, selling,
or possession of protected animals under the three federal wildlife statutes
discussed above have defended primarily on the theory that their hunting
rights are guaranteed by treaty. 70 While this treaty defense includes the
right to .take animals for any purpose, some defendants have argued,
alternatively, that they have a First Amendment right to take animals
pursuant to their free exercise of religion.37 Absolutely essential to the
broader treaty defense is the position that the three wildlife statutes do
not abrogate existing treaty rights.
168. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
169. Id. at 49.
170. For treaty defenses see, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (Yankton Sioux 1858
treaty); United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980) (Tulalip--Treaty of Point Elliot);
United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974) (Chippewa--implied rights, not pursuant to
a specific treaty); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986) (Islet. Pueblo--Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo--but grounded in religious freedom under the treaty, not hunting rights);

United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nev. 1986) (Chippewa); United
States v. Aliard. 397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mon. 1975) (Confederated Salish and Kootena Tribe-Hell
Gate Treaty); and see United States v. Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724 (D. Idaho 1941) (holding MBTA did
not abrogte treaty right to hunt birds on the reservation).
171. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985) (this aspect of the Dion defense
was not included in the appeal to the Supreme Court); United States v. L. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. C. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Abeyta.
632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986); United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269
(D. Nev. 1986).
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It is undisputed that Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally
an existing treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe by an
express statutory provision. ,72
However, none of the three federal wildlife
statutes contains an express abrogation provision. Consequently, Indians
frequently assert treaty rights defenses to prosecutions for killing wildlife.'" Where no excess abrogation is indicated, courts must decide if
abrogation was implied.'74 Applicability of each of the three wildlife
statutes on Indian land will be discussed in turn.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act vs. Treaty Rights
The earliest of the three statutes, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was
the first wildlife statute to provoke an analysis of whether the statute
abrogated existing treaty rights by implication. In 1941, in United States
v. Cutler,'" a federal district judge concluded that the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act did not abrogate existing treaty rights. 76 However, because
the court's holding rested upon the erroneous legal premise that Indian
treaties are not subject to subsequent congressional amendment,' 77 other
courts largely disregarded the opinion. In 1986, United States v. Dion,
virtually overruled Cutler.'8
The question of treaty abrogation by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
has not reached the Supreme Court. However, in 1979, in Andrus v.
Allard,' the Court considered the issue of whether the statute's prohibitions applied to bird artifacts taken prior to its enactment. In holding
that the prohibitions were effective without regard to when the birds were
originally killed, 'I the Court concluded that because Congress explicitly
provided very narrow exceptions, no further ones would be implied.'
In adopting a strict statutory interpretation of the Migratory Bird.Treaty
Act, it would arguably be inconsistent with Allard for the Court to find
an implied treaty exemption.
172. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); see generally F. Cohen, Federal Indian
Law (2d ed. 1979).
173. See sources cited supra note 170.
174. See Wilkinson and Vilkman. Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As
Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is That?. 63 Calif. L. Rev. 601
(1975). The authors conclude that courts have primarily relied upon four tests in assessing possible
abrogations: I) abrogation only upon a clear showing of legislative intent. 2) abrogation not lightly
implied, 3) abrogation only after liberal construction of the statute in favor of Indian treaty rights,
and 4) abrogation only after express legislative reference to Indian treaty rights. Id. at 623.
175. 37 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Idaho 1941).

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); see infra text accompanying notes 194-201.
179. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).

180. Id. at 63.
181. Id. at 60.
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Eagle Protection Act vs. Treaty Rights
The vast majority of the treaty defenses have occurred in response to
prosecutions under the Eagle Protection Act."I Due to the habitat range
of eagles, the majority of early cases arose in the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits, which quickly became entrenched in opposing views of whether
the EPA implied abrogation of treaty rights.'
In 1974, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. White,'" held that the
Eagle Protection Act had not rescinded the treaty rights of the Chippewa
Indians to hunt bald eagles because Congress had not clearly expressed
an explicit intent to abrogate.'" The court cited Cutler with approval,"
and failed to consider any alternative tests' 8 for implied rescission. In a
now famous dissent," Judge Lay argued eloquently that the statutory
goal of eagle protection was inherently inconsistent with a finding of no
abrogation."'9
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit cited and adopted Judge Lay's analysis in
United States v. Fryberg."° In affirming a conviction under the Eagle
Protection Act for the killing of an immature bald eagle, the court held
that treaty rights which were inconsistent with the Eagle Protection Act
were abrogated, absent a permit granted pursuant to the statutory religious
exemption.'' The court found that the statutory restrictions involved a
"relatively insignificant modification of the Indian's hunting rights"' 92
and concluded that abrogation was implied because Congress clearly
intended to prohibit all threats to the bald eagle's survival.' 93
Five years later, the Eighth Circuit returned to the question in United
States v. Dion,'" which involved a variety of charges pursuant to the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Eagle Protection Act, and the Endangered
Species Act. Charges included takings, possession, and commercial sales
of both bald and golden eagles. 9 " Defendant Dwight Dion Sr. contended,
inter alia, that both his treaty rights and First Amendment religious rights
precluded liability. '" When the Eighth Circuit held that neither the Eagle
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
t91.

16 U.S.C. §668 (1988).
M. Bean, supra note 62, at 95-97.
508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 457-58 (relying upon Menominee Tribe v.United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968)).
Id. at 459.
See supra note 174.
White, 508 F.2d at 459 (Lay. J.,dissenting).
Id. at 461 (Lay, J.,dissenting).
622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1016.

192. Id. at 1014,
193. Id. at 1015.

194. There am two Eighth Circuit opinions of United States v. Dion: 752 F.2d 1261 (1985) (en
banc), and 762 F.2d 674 (1985). This reference is to 752 F.2d 1261.
195. Id. at 1262.
196. 762 F.2d 674. 679 (1985).
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Protection Act nor the Endangered Species Act applied to Indians exercising non-commercial hunting rights on Indian lands, 97 the Supreme
Court immediately granted certiorari.The specific issue on certiorari
was whether the Eagle Protection Act abrogated the right of Indians to
hunt eagles." While acknowledging that the Eagle Protection Act did
not expressly abrogate that right, the Court concluded that the inclusion
of a religious permit exemption within the act strongly suggested Congress
intended Indians to be subject to the prohibitions.'" The Court held
unanimously that the EPA did abrogate, by implication, inconsistent treaty
hunting rights.' Justice Marshall, writing for the court, noted that while
the Court need not reach the issue of whether the Endangered Species
Act similarly implied abrogation, the two acts in relevant part prohibit
exactly the same conduct for the same reasons."

Endangered Species Act vs. Treaty Rights
One year later, in 1987, the issue of abrogation by the Endangered
Species Act came before a federal district court in UnitedStates v. Billie. 2
The United States charged James Billie, chairman of the Seminole Indian
Tribe, with killing a Florida panther, listed as endangered under the
Endangered Species Act.2 3 In a motion to dismiss, Billie argued that
tradition protected his right to freely hunt. '- The court concluded that
creation of the Indian reservation by executive order granted implied
hunting rights to the same extent as a treaty, and proceeded with an
abrogation analysis. The court cited Justice Douglas' famous Steelhead
declaration' for the proposition that Indian treaty rights do not extend
to the point of extinction. 2' Noting that, legislative history indicated that
Congress actually considered and rejected an Indian exemption, the court
concluded that abrogation is implied because "Congress . . . could not
have intended that the Indians would have the unfettered right to kill the
last handful of Florida panthers."" 7
Following Dion and Billie, the viability of asserting a treaty rights
defense to prosecutions under the three federal wildlife statutes discussed
above is doubtful. Although the Supreme Court has only found the Eagle
197. 752 F2d 1261, 1270 (1985).
198. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).

199. Id. at 740.
200. Id. at 746.
201. Id.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
50 C.F.R. §17.11 (1988).
Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1488.
Id. at 1489.
Id. at 1489-90.
Id. at 1492.
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Protection Act to imply an abrogation of treaty rights, the dictum in Dion
strongly suggests that the Endangered Species Act would be similarly
construed. The subsequent Billie opinion lends further support to this
conclusion. The impact of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act on treaty ights
also remains unresolved, but a finding of abrogation would be most
consistent with the Court's recent holding in Dion. While some aspects
of the treaty abrogation issue remain unsettled, there is little dispute that,
following Dion, the probability of a successful treaty defense is extremely
low. Consequently, as the treaty defense becomes progressively more
limited, the alternative defense of First Amendment free exercise of religion takes on new significance.
II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION STANDARDS
A majority of Americans in the twentieth century have never experienced religious persecution. But many of their ancestors Came to the
colonies seeking relief from the religious intolerance of their homelands.
To their new land, they brought a fierce determination to establish a nation
where religious oppresiion was unknown. The First Amendment to the
Constitution contains the full measure of that resolve, forbidding Congress
from enacting laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'

In simultaneously protecting against both governmentally endorsed relgions and governmental prohibitions of religious practice, the framers of
the Constitution created an uneasy tension between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. For example, exemptions granted
under the Free Exercise Clause may raise allegations of the preferential
treatment of religions prohibited under the Establishment Clause.' Recent court decisions that rejected Indian free exercise claims involving
public lands have been denied on the ground that allowing exclusive
access to Indians would favor Indian religions over other religions in
violation of the Establishment Clause.2 '0 The tension between the two
constitutional clauses is the source of only one of the many difficulties
208. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
209. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 53, at 1166-69.

210. See. e.g., Inupiat Community Of The Arctic Slope v. United States. 548 F. Supp. 182 (D.
Alaska 1982), aftd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied. 474 U.S. 820 (1985). where the
Inupiat Indians argued a free exercise claim that their religious beliefs are "inextricably intertwined"
with their hunting and gathering life-style, therefore, the leasing of off.short mineral rights created
a burden upon their free exercise of religion. The claim was rejected in part because the relief sought
("a vast religious sanctuary") would create serious Establishment Clause problems, id. at 188-89;
Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), afd. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). (Where, in response to a Navajo free exercise challenge involving
continued access to Rainbow Bridge, the court found that restricting public access to Rainbow Bridge
to accommodate Navajo religious practices would constitute a prohibited governmental preference

for religion under the Establishment Clause.) Id. at 179.
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which plague free exercise analysis. In 1991, the Free Exercise Clause
will be two hundred years old, yet there is remarkably little judicial
consensus concerning how courts should evaluate the merits of a free
exercise claim." These existing difficulties are intensifying as courts face
increasingly complex claims involving Indian free exercise of religion.
Development of a Free Exercise Standard
Protection of individual constitutional rights necessarily includes a right
of access to the courts when a protected right is threatened. When a free
exercise violation is alleged, courts must weigh the validity of the claim,
presumably by following an established standard of review. Defining an
appropriate test, however, has proved elusive. Historically, the United
States Supreme Court began defining a free exercise test by distinguishing
between religious belief and religious conduct, finding that although freedom of belief is absolute, freedom of religious conduct remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society. 2 Consistent with that principle,
the Court concluded that governmental burdens upon religious practices
will be tolerated only where the governmental interest outweighs the
individual's interest in an exemption. 2' 3
By the early 1970s, a basic two part inquiry emerged from a series of
Supreme Court cases.? 4 The first inquiry is whether a burden upon religious practices is shown. The burden inquiry includes a showing that
the religious practice is rooted in religious belief, and that the adherent
is sincere in that belief.2 ' If the claimant meets that burden of proof, the
second inquiry is whether the government can justify its infringement of
religious practices, usually by proof of a compelling interest. 2' 6 If the
government is able to show a compelling interest, the infringement may
be upheld if there is no less restrictive alternative. 21 7 However, if the
government's interest is outweighed by the individual's interest, an exemption may be granted.'
Although the rough contours of this free exercise test remained constant
during the last several years, emphasis within the elements is shifting.
211. Johnson. Concepts And Compromises In First Amendment Religious Doctrine. 72 Calif. L.
Rev. 817. 819 (1984).
212. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (overturning the conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting funds without a license because they were engaged in distribution
of religious materials).
213. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (compelling government interest).
214. For the progressive development, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
215. Yader. 406 U.S. at 205, 215-16.
216. Sherbert. 374 U.S. at 406.
217. Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981).
218. For a general discussion of religious exemptions, see Note. Religious Exemptions Under the
Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 Yale L. J. 350 (1980).
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Of particular importance is the recent emergence of the burden element
as a formidable threshold obstacle to First Amendment religious claims.""
From 1963 to 1986, for example, no Supreme Court case found an alleged
burden to be insufficient to satisfy the test's first requirement. ' However,
beginning in 1986, a significantly more stringent burden requirement
emerged, primarily in Indian free exercise cases,"' resulting in the denial
of most free exercise claims. With the recent increase in complex Indian
free exercise claims involving religious use of drugs,' public lands,"
and animals,"' the standard for free exercise analysis is increasingly
plagued by both inconsistent elements and inconsistent analysis.
After treaty rights defenses lost their viability following Dion,"' interest
intensified in potential Indian free exercise of religion defenses to federal
219. See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem Of Burdens On The Free Exercise Of Religion,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 933 (1989); Note, Burdens On The Free Exercise Of Religion: A Subjective
Analysis, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1258 (1989).
220. Lupu, supra note 219, at 942.
221. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding
that virtual destruction of a site-specific Indian religion by completion of a logging road did not
constitute a burden upon free exercise); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that governmental requirement of a social security number to receive benefits did not constitute a legally
cognizable burden on Indian's free exercise of religion); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 744-45
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding land was indispensable to Navajo and Hopi site specific religious practices,
but no burden was shown because expansion of pre-existing ski resort would not significantly restrict
access).
222. Religious use of peyote came before the United States Supreme Court this term in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 58 U.S.L.W. 4433 (U.S. April
1989) (No. 88-1213) (holding that Oregon criminal statute prohibiting use of peyote is constitutional;
consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, Oregon may deny unemployment benefits to persons fired
for religious use of peyote). As the first Supreme Court opinion to directly address Indian use of
peyote, the Smith opinion is consistent with the increasingly narrow First Amendment interpretations
of the current Court. The federal government does exempt religious use of peyote by members of
the Native American Church from controlled substance laws. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1988). In addition,
eleven states expressly exempt sacramental peyote use from criminal prosecution. Twelve other states
have exemptions linked to those available under federal law. 58 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Sept. 26,
1989).
See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Meese, 698 F. Supp. 1342 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Native
American Church of New York v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). aff'd, 633
F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1980); Whitehorn v. State of Oklahoma, Okl. Cr. 561 P.2d 539 (1977); State v.
Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964). See generally Note, Religion: The Psychedelic Perspective: The
Freedom of Religion Defense. I I Am. Ind. L. Rev. 125 (1983).
223. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Crow v.
Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), a'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 I.L.R. 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), af d sub
nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied. 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Sequoyah
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aft'd 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977),
af'd 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980, cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
224. United States v. Hinds, No. 89-46 (D.N.M. filed Sept. 15, 1989) vacated Jan. 19, 1990
(trial date pending); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987); United States v.
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
225. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
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wildlife regulation. As a result, debate also intensified over the applicable
standard of review.2"6 In the context of Indian free exercise claims, some
commentators contend that Indians are subject to a higher burden of proof
than similar non-Indian claimants." This higher burden of proof generally
requires Indian claimants to prove that a religious practice is central or
indispensable' to their religion before it will be eligible to satisfy the
burdened religious practice requirement. 9 Such a requirement is in striking contrast to previous free exercise analysis where claimants were required only to show a sincerely held religious belief."
The Emergence of the Centrality Requirement
. Despite numerous commentaries on the appearance of a higher centrality standard in Indian free exercise cases, 23 ' there has been little attention given to identifying the possible reasons for this new emphasis.
-The debate over centrality is now focused on the propriety and means of
judicial evaluation of the relative importance of religious practices within
a religion. '2 However, at the heart of this debate lies the more fundamental
question of whether constitutional protection can be limited to selected
religious practices, or whether protection extends to all religious practices
identified as sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. Recent constitutional law analysis suggests that a redefinition of burden is occurring.
This redefinition is taking two primary forms, first by increased emphasis
on governmental coercion as the primary form of burden, 3 and second
by recognizing only burdens upon central religious practices." While
there is some evidence that a higher standard is increasingly coloring all
free exercise analysis,23 its more frequent application in Indian free exercise cases raises disturbing ethical and practical questions. Although
some commentators believe the centrality test is a deliberate attempt to
226. See. e.g.. Gordon, Indian Religious Freedon And Governmental Development of Public
Lands, 94 Yale L.J. 1447 (1985); Pepper, The Conundrum Of The Free Exercise Clause-Some
Reflections On Recent Cases. 9 N. Ky. L. Rev. 265 (1982); Rosenberg, Native Americans' Access
To ReligiousSites: Underprotected Under The Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 463 (1985).
227. Stambor, Manifest DestinyAndAmerican Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah. BadoniAnd
The Drowned Gods, 10 Amer. Ind. L. Rev. 59 (1982); Comment, Religious Freedom For Indigenous
Americans, 65 Or. L. Rev. 363 (1986); Comment, First Americans And The First Amendment:
American Indians Battle For Religious Freedom, 13 So. Ill. U.L.J. 945, 967 (1989).
228. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F2d 735 at 743.
229. Each of the commentaries in supra note 227 identifies centrality as the factor raising the
burden of proof.
230. For a reversal based upon the lower court requiring centrality rather than a sincerely held
religious belief, see Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
23 1. See supra note 227.
232. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 457 (1988).
233. Id. at 448-51.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 244-87.
235. See generally Lupu, supra note 219.
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discriminate against Indian plaintiffs," 6 two more probable reasons exist.
First, centrality represents an attempt to overcome judicial unfamiliarity
with Indian religious practices." When a plaintiff comes before the court
asserting a First Amendment right to not be forced to work on his or her
Sabbath, most judges will have a certain familiarity with the place of
Sabbath in western religions. However, when a plaintiff comes bef6re
the court claiming that restricted access to a particular rock or mountain
peak is a religious crisis of constitutional significance, many judges are
uncertain how to evaluate the claim. Yet, even if a centrality requirement
were a sincere effort to understand the. significance of a given religious
practice, judicial evaluation of centrality raises a second question. As
recently indicated by the Supreme Court, the propriety of ajudicial inquiry
into such internal religious matters is doubtful.23 In addition, as Justice
Brennan has noted, there are inherent ethnocentric implications ofjudicial
evaluations of unfamiliar Indian religions." 9
The second, and perhaps less charitable, explanation for the emergence
of centrality is the possibility that it is a standard of convenience, used
selectively to halt certain First Amendment claims which threaten various
economic interests such as property rights or large public works such as
dams. It is indisputable that a majority of Indian free exercise cases
involving federal land interests or public works required a centrality
element. 240Although some federal district courts have denied Indian free
exercise claims on the rationale that the Indians have no property right
to the sacred site, appellate courts consistently overturned those findings
on appeal.2 '" However, a recent Supreme Court opinion, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, discussed in detail below,
suggests that a property rights' analysis in the free exercise context is not
precluded. 242
236. See. e.g.. Stambor, supra note 227.
237. See. e.g., People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69. 394 P.2d 813 (1964).

238. The burden inquiry includes not only a determination of whether a restriction or burden is
present, but also whether the claimant is sincere, and whether the belief is rooted in a religious
belief. A determination of the validity of an asserted belief, however, is generally considered to be
an inappropriate judicial inquiry. In Ballard v. United States. for example, the Court held that
inquiries into the veracity of an asserted religious belief was not a judicial function. 322 U.S. 78
(1944). As a result, the Supreme Court has established a broad scope of protected religious beliefs.
See L. Tribe, supra note 53. at 1179.
239. See, e.g.. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 474 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).
240. See Comment, Indian Worship v. Government Development: A New Breed ofReligion Cases.
275 Utah L. Rev. 313, 323 (1984).
241. See, e.g., Badoni. 638 F.2d at 176 ("[Wle reject the conclusion that the plaintiff's lack of
property rights in the Monument is determinative"); Sequoyah. 620 F2d at 1164 (finding a lack of
property interest not conclusive, but one potential factor in balancing free exercise against govern-

mental interests).
242. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53.
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Sequential Adoption of Centrality
Explicit recognition of centrality as a factor in free exercise analysis
began in a Navajo challenge to criminal prohibitions on peyote use. ' 4" A
series of court hearing cases involving Indian religious sites on federal
lands adopted a centrality element, 2 " and the requirement then appeared
in the context of Indian killing of federally protected animals. 241 Considering the crippling effect that centrality was ultimately to have on Indian
free exercise claims, it is ironic that it was first emphasized in an effort
to exempt Indian peyote use from criminal penalties. In 1964, the California Supreme Court reversed the criminal conviction of a group of
Navajo Indians in People v. Woody." Although Woody is often cited as
the case which established centrality as a "requirement" of free exercise
analysis,247 that conclusion is not supported either by the opinion itself
or by subsequent cases.
At issue in Woody was whether Navajo members of the Native American
Church were subject to criminal prosecution for participation in sacramental peyote rites. 24' The court acknowledged the undisputed sincerity
of the church members, and began with the premise that the state may
abridge religious practices only when a compelling state interest outweighs the individual's free exercise rights. '4 After concluding that peyote use constitutes the theological heart of the religion .2 the court rejected
the state's argument that prohibition was necessary to rescue Indians from
their "shackles," declaring: "We know of no doctrine that the state, in
its asserted omniscience should undertake to deny the defendants the
observance of their religion in order to free them from their suppositious
'shackles' of their 'unenlightened' and 'primitive condition.' "25
In concluding that the record revealed peyote use to be essential to the
religion, the court, by implication, distinguished the sacramental use of
peyote from casual recreational use. 252 The only language in the Woody
243. People'v. Woody. 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964).
244. Sequoyah. 620 F.2d at 1164-65; Wilson, 708 F.2d at 743. (Agreeing with plaintiffs that First
Amendment protection does not tum on the theological importance of the disputed activity; then
finding, "illf the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the government land at issue is indispensable to
some religious practice, whether or not central to their religion, they have not justified a First
Amendment claim.") Id.
245. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (taking a panther); United States
v. Abeyta. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986) (taking an eagle).
246. 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813.
247. See Sequoyah. 620 F.2d at 247; Lupu, supra note 219, at 958.
248. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 70, 394 P.2d at 813.
249. Id. at 71,394 P.2d at 815.
250. id. at 74, 394 P.2d at 818.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 73, 394 P.2d at 817.
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opinion which in any way supports a claim of requiring centrality as an
element is the description that the "test of constitutionality calls for an
examination of the degree of abridgement of religious freedom involved
in each case."' 3 However, a distinction exists between the degree to
which a governmental practice burdens a religious practice and the degree
to which a religious practice is essential to the religion. Degree of abridgement suggests an impact analysis; ' that is, whether a governmental
restriction makes religious practice more expensive, more difficult, or
virtually impossible. It does not imply a determination of the relative
value of various practices acknowledged to be part of the religion. The
Woody court found the impact of prohibition would be virtually to destroy
and concluded that the government could not justify such an
the religion
impact." s
Following Woody, the issue of centrality was to lie dormant for nearly
fifteen years. 2' Then, in the 1980s, centrality emerged to become a
formidable obstacle in Indian free exercise cases involving federal public
lands. This sudden appearance of centrality triggered debate whether
centrality actually serves either to help the court understand an unfamiliar
religion, or to provide a selectively applied standard of convenience.
The classic example of the adoption of centrality is the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,"' just one year after
the snail darter lost its own battle against TVA.2 In rejecting a claim
that impounding the Tellico Dam would destroy the Cherokee's sacred
areas, the court concluded that the "claim of centrality of the Valley to
the practice of the traditional Cherokee religion, as required by Yoder,
Woody and Frank, is missing from this case."' 9 This rationale for application of a centrality requirement appears well supported until the cited
cases are carefully reviewed.
In the first case cited, Wisconsin v. Yoder, I the United States Supreme
Court found compulsory high school attendance to constitute an impermissible infringement of the religious rights of the Amish. In concluding
that education was a religious endeavor central to their faith,"6 the Supreme Court distinguished the Amish from other communities where
education was entirely a secular concern. The Court granted a religious
253. Id. at 76, 394, P.2d at 820.
254. See Lyng, 485 U.S. 467 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
255. Woody 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74, 77, 394 P.2d at 818, 821.
256. In the free exercise cases involving drugs which followed Woody, for example, there is no
discussion of centrality. United States v. Kuch, 288 F.Supp. 439 (D.C. 1968);Arizonav. Wittingham,
19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973); Whitehom v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1977).
257. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d 1159.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 135-59.

259. Seq.oyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
260. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
261. Id.at210.
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exemption on a finding that for the Amish their way of life was inseparable
from their religious beliefs.262 In Sequoyah,26 3 the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the Cherokees similarly failed to establish that the Valley was inseparable from their way of life. 2'
There is an important distinction between use of centrality for inclusion
versus exclusion. In Yoder and in Woody, "65 the centrality of a given
practice is cited as evidence that something which appears to be secular,
such as education or recreational drug use, in fact carries religious significance. This is distinguishable from centrality's use as a threshold
requirement, which will exclude constitutional protection of relatively
minor practices. Such exclusion is totally inconsistent with the practice
of applying a balancing test to evaluate free exercise claims. Even a
relatively minor religious practice could still be accommodated if the
corresponding governmental interest is similarly insignificant. Because
the underlying purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to guard against
unwarranted restriction of religious practices, 2 e a very strong argument
can be made that a centrality threshold which excludes relatively minor
practices violates the spirit of the Free Exercise Clause. Sequoyah's reliance upon Yoder for a requirement of centrality as a potentially exclusionary factor is particularly ironic, since Yoder stands for recognition of
an extremely broad interpretation of religious practice.67 Similarly, as
discussed above, Woody also fails to establish the incorporation of centrality as a threshold exclusionary requirement."
The third case cited, Frank v. State,2' not only fails to support the
incorporation of a centrality requirement, but actually opposes it. At issue
in Frank was a violation of Alaska game laws by an Indian who killed
a moose out of season for religious purposes, a potlatch funeral ceremony.27° The lower court convicted Frank on the rationale that moose
meat was not "an absolute necessity" of the potlatch." 1 The Alaska
Supreme Court reversed, declaring: "Absolute necessity is a standard
stricter than that which the law imposes. It is sufficient that the practice,
be deeply rooted in religious belief to bring it within the ambit of the
free exercise clause." 272
262. Id.
263. Seqnoyah. 620 F.2d at1159.
264. Id. at 1164.
265. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; Woody. 40 Cal. Rptr. at73. 394 P.2d at817.
266. L. Tribe, supra note 53, at 1154, 1158.
267. By extending First Amendment protection to the realm of compulsory education, Yoder
broadened the definition of religious practice to incorporate what had been previously considered a
secular realm. 406 U.S. 205. 216.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 249-56.
269. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1072.
272. Id.
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Despite the apparent lack of valid authority for imposing a centrality
requirement, following Sequoyah centrality was imposed constantly, particularly in the context of free exercise challenges involving federal public
lands. This constant imposition of centrality would ultimately culminate
in Supreme Court review in 1988,273 but meanwhile, application of the
centrality standard spread from drug and public land cases to wildlife
protection.
Centrality and Federal Wildlife Protection
Building on the rather dubious momentum initiated by Sequoyah, the
centrality requirement recently reached free exercise analysis in the wildlife context. In United States v. Billie,'74 the United States charged James
Billie, tribal chairman of the Seminoles, with killing a Florida panther,
in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 2 " Florida panthers are not
only currently listed as endangered, 76 but were identified as endangered
even prior to enactment of the 1973 act.2 " Testimony at the Billie trial
estimated the total remaining panther population to be between twenty
and fifty panthers."t
The federal district court's denial of a motion to dismiss turned on a
finding that panther parts were not indispensable to Seminole religious
practices.'7T The court did not reject the claim on the basis of an insufficient
burden on religion, but rather contrasted it with the compelling government interest in protecting the species. 2" Noting the lack of an exception
for Indian hunting under the Endangered Species Act and the statute's
stringent mandate to protect endangered species, the court concluded that
Congress "could not have intended that the Indians would28 have the un-

fettered right to kill the last handful of Florida panthers." '

273. Lyng. 485 U.S. 439.
274. 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
275. Id. at 1487.
276. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1988).
277. The Florida panther appeared on the list of endangered species living on Indian lands which
was submitted by the Department of the Interior to Congress during hearings for the proposed
Endangered Species Act. See supra note 133. Recently, an interagency commission in Florida has
launched an all out effort to save the remaining Florida panthers. In June 1989, the new 30,000 acre
Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge was created, abutting the existing Big Cypress National
Park. To reduce the risk of panther-car collisions, 36 bridges and overpasses and a ten foot fence
are being constructed along nearby highways. Complicating the rescue efforts is new evidence of
mercury contamination in the panther food supply. See Rember, Cougar: And Then There's The
FloridaPanther,Wildlife Conservation 79 (Mar/Apr 1990).
278. Billie. 667 F. Supp. at 1496 (Testimony by David Maehr, a certified wildlife biologist
employed by the Florida Game and Freshwater Fish Commission).
279. Testimony indicated that panther parts are "an important part of a medicine man's bundle"
and that panther claws ae good for various ailments, particularly muscle cramps. Id. at 1497. Citing
Sequovah, the Billie court found the evidence fell short of being central or indispensable to religious

observances. Id.
280. Id. at 1496.
281. Id. at 1492,
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The facts in Billie did not strongly support a finding of either religious
use or the indispensability often required to show centrality. However,
when eagles are involved, the facts are more likely to satisfy a centrality
standard, due to the importance of eagles in most Indian religions. In
1986, for example, in United States v. Abeyta, a federal district court
held, inter alia, that the taking of a golden eagle upon pueblo land for
religious purposes was protected conduct under the Free Exercise Clause. 82
In language tailored to satisfy any centrality requirement, the Court
noted that "The Katsina,"' or spirit of life, and the eagle, the embodiment
of the overseer of life, are the central forces in pueblo religious belief. "'
The court concluded that "the eagle holds an exalted position in all
religious societies. The use of their feathers . . . is indispensable, to the
ceremonies of the Katsina society and other pueblo rituals." 285 The court
concluded that the government's interest fell short of compelling both
because golden eagles are not an endangered species, and because the
government's interest was outweighed by Abeyta's very compelling religious interest. -'
Although the Abeyta court did not apply centrality as a requirement,
its analysis reflects the increasing incorporation of centrality into Indian
free exercise cases. In contrast to the nearly insurmountable difficulty of
showing centrality in the context of sacred sites on federal lands, there
is every reason to believe that Indian claimants will be able to establish
that eagles are indisputably indispensable for ceremonial purposes.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association
In 1982, a case destined to become the most important Indian free
exercise case to date began working its way toward the Supreme Court.
As the first Indian free exercise case to easily satisfy the centrality requirement, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. 7
finally provoked a Supreme Court discussion of the heightened centrality
requirement. In. retrospect, it is perhaps unfortunate that Lyng became
the case to test the issue of centrality. As a free exercise challenge to
management of federal public lands, the issue of federal land use management arguably controlled and clouded the Court's analysis.
At issue in Lyng was whether completion of a logging road by the
U.S. Forest Service through an area of the Six Rivers National Forest in
California would violate the First Amendment religious rights of Indians
282. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
283. Defendant Jose Abeyta is a member of the Isleta Pueblo Katsina Society. The Katsina Society
is described as "an independent and sometimes secretive religious society that engages in traditional
ceremonial practices deeply rooted in ancient pueblo religion. Id. at 1303.

284. Id.
285. Id.
286. td. at 1307-08.
287. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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who used the area for religious practices. The United States Forest Service
ironically provided the strongest evidence that the element of centrality
was satisfied. During the planning stage for the proposed road, the U.S.
Forest Service commissioned a study on the potential ethnographic impacts of the road. The resulting Theodoratus Report' confirmed that
three local tribes used the area for religious practices, and found that
completion of the road would be "potentially destructive of the very core
of Northwest [Indian] religious beliefs and practices. " 9 This destruction
would result not from denied access, but from the destruction of, the
privacy, silence, and pristine natural setting required for sacred ceremonies.' When the Forest Service failed to show a countervailing compelling interest, the district court granted a permanent injunction,' which
the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed on appeal. ' "
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit Lyng opinion represented the only successful
assertion of an Indian free exercise claim involving federal public lands.
This distinction, however, proved short lived, when the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. In 1988, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
concluded that the Indians' religious practices were not unconstitutionally
burdened, despite an undisputed finding that the road would virtually
destroy the site-specific religion.293 The Court narrowly focused its analysis on a search for governmental coercion. 9 Finding that completion
of the road would not coerce Indians into violating their beliefs, Justice
O'Connor concluded that no burden existed. 9
The Court found the facts of Lyng analogous to a previous Indian free
exercise case, Roy v. Bowen,' where an Indian unsuccessfully challenged
the governmental requirement of an assigned social security number to
receive government benefits.'9 7 Justice O'Connor described the federal
land management issues of Lyng as "indistinguishable" from the internal
governmental procedures at issue in Roy.?' The majority cited Roy with
approval: "The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to
require the government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."' The three288.
289.
290.
291.
1983).
292.
293.

Id. at 442, 459.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 462.
Northwest Indian Cenetety Protective Assn. v. Peterson. 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
Lyng. 485 U.S. at 447. 451.

294. Id. at 448-53.
295. Id. at 451-52, 465, 472 (Brennan, J.,dissenting)..
296. Id. at 448 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986)).

297. id.
298. Id. at 449.
299. Id. at 448.
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justice dissent strongly objected that this was a distinction of form over
substance,' ° and urged the majority to consider the effect of the government action rather than the mere fact that it was "internal. "' The dissent
also viewed the majority's exclusive focus on coercion as fundamentally
inconsistent with prior free exercise analysis because it disregarded the
effect of the government action. '°
Acknowledging that a law forbidding Indian access to the area would
raise constitutional questions different from the destruction of privacy
and silence at issue in Lyng?0' Justice O'Connor declared that "Whatever
rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights
do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land."' This statement is remarkable in its disregard of the First Amendment mandate that government conduct conform to constitutional standards. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit recently reviewed a similar Indian
free exercise challenge to federal land use, and concluded that "The
government must manage its property in a manner that does not offend
the Constitution." ' J 5 The Lyng dissent described the majority's refusal to
recognize a cognizable burden as stemming from a fear that such recognition could strip the government of its ability to manage and use
federal lands.'
The dissent also raised the issue of the validity of a centrality requirement. Although the dissenters acknowledged that a centrality requirement
is inherently ethnocentric because it incorrectly assumes that Indian religions are organized in a typically western hierarchical manner,' ° they
concluded that a centrality requirement could help reconcile these fundamentally incompatible interests.' To avoid a seemingly inappropriate
*judicial determination of what is central to a given Indian religion, the
dissent suggested that the Indians themselves should make the determination." In response, Justice O'Connor argued that neither means of
determining centrality was acceptable."' If the Indian claimant made the
centrality determination, the centrality requirement would be reduced to

a mere untested assertion." In the alternative, if the court made the
300. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented. id. at 470 (Brennan, ., dissenting).
301. Id. at 467 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

302. Id.
303. Id. at 453.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Badoni. 638 F.2d at 176.
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473 (Bremnnan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 474 (Brennan. J., dissenting).

308. Id.
309. Id. a 475 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310. Id. at 457-58.
311. Id. at 457.
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determination, it would "cast the judiciary in a role that we were never
intended to play. " 2
By granting certiorariin Lyng, the Supreme Court raised hopes that
a clear standard for evaluating Indian free exercise claims finally would
emerge. Instead, the opinion further obscured the already confused issue
of applicable standards. With both the majority and the dissent in agreement that a judicial evaluation of centrality is suspect for various reasons,
not only the propriety of a centrality standard is now at issue, but also
whether there are any acceptable means of achieving that evaluation.
Although Lyng casts doubt on the continued viability of applying a centrality requirement, the opinion simultaneously fails to provide lower
courts with any guidelines to use in considering the next free exercise
challenge. The majority's narrow and exclusive focus on coercion, to the
exclusion of other aspects of the burden analysis, leaves a frustrating lack
of principled guidelines. Further, the entire analysis appeared indelibly
colored by the fact that management of federal lands was at issue; a fact
which arguably should not have intruded into the first stage burden evaluation.
As testimony to the lack of resolution achieved by Lyng, it has been
rarely cited by the Supreme Court in subsequent free exercise cases. 3
Even more confusing evidence of the lack of resolution is the fact that
despite Justice O'Connor's rejection of centrality in Lyng, she now describes the free exercise test as including a centrality element. In the first
free exercise opinion of 1990, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
described the free exercise inquiry as "whether [the] government has
placed a substantial burden on the observation of a centralreligious belief
or practice ..
.34 In contrast, just six months earlier, Justice Marshall
used the identical description as Justice O'Connor, then qualified it by
adding, "It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular
litigants' interepretations of those creeds." 1s Following Lyng, lower courts
still have no consistent standard by which to weigh the conflicting interests
of Indian free exercise of religion and governmental regulation.
Accommodation of Religious Practices
Religious freedom is considered such a fundamental right that the goal
of accommodating religious practices is inherent in free exercise analy312. Id. at 458.
313. See. e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security. - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1514
(1989) (upholding an individual's right to refuse to work on their sabbath, despite the fact that he
was not a member of an established religion. Lyng is not cited, in a case which suggests a similar
coercion analysis).
U.S. _. 110 S.Ct. 688. 693 (1990)
314. Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization. (emphasis added).
109 S.Ct. 2139, 2149
U.S. -,
315. Hemandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (1989).
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sis." 6 The degree of accommodation possible is determined by balancing
the individual's interest against the governmental interest. In the case of
Indian free exercise of religion, for example, there is a very strong argument that religious practices involving sacred sites on public lands
could and should be accommodated.' The governmental interest in land
management is considerably less compelling than protection of endangered species.' 8 In addition, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
of 1978 declares the preservation of Indian religious practices to be federal
policy.3"9 Legislative history reveals that continued access to religious
sites was a primary concern of Congress. "
There is one relevant example of an effort to accommodate Indian
religious use of animals in the context of federal wildlife protection.
When Congress amended the Eagle Protection Act in 196232 to include
golden eagles, it recognized that the new prohibitions would seriously
impair Indian religious practices. 22 To accommodate the need for eagles
without defeating the purpose of the statute, Congress authorized an
Indian religious permit system." 3 Under Department of the Interior regulations promulgated pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act, Indians may
apply to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service for a permit to kill
an eagle, or may apply to receive eagle parts or entire bodies.2 4 The
Secretary of the Interior must personally approve a permit to kill an eagle,
and only one such permit has ever been issued. "5 The permit process to
316. Accommodation of religious free exercise necessarily involves a determination of what is
mandatory accommodation, what is permissible accommodation, and what accommodation is forbidden as a violation of the Establishment Clause. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 53, at 1169.
317. Despite the fact that Indian free exercise claims involving sacred sites have been uniformly
unsuccessful, religious practices on public lands and governmental interests are still more compatible
than conflicts involving protected wildlilfe. In the seventies, for example..Congress returned a sacred
lake to the Taos Pueblo in New Mexico. Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970).
In the same decade, Congress guaranteed access rights to sacred sites in the Grand Canyon to the
Havasupai. Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-620, § 10. 88 Stat. 2091 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §2281
(1988)). Although recent sacred sites cases have been less successful, many of those cases were
fatally flawed by their timing. In balancing the interests, the governmental interest is going to be
considered very compelling where millions of dollars are already spent on a public works project.
Although lyng suggests otherwise, for many sacred site claims, early action could reduce the weight

of the govenmental interest.
318. See. e.g., Lyng. 485 U.S. at 465.
319. American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA). 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). Although
AIRFA declares preservation of Indian religions to be federal policy in sweeping language, the statute
has been held to create no legally enforceable rights. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455: but see id. at 471
(Brennan, J.,dissenting): "the absence of any private right of action in no way undermines the
statute's significance ...."Unfortunately, most courts are concluding that all that the statute requires
is for federal agencies "to consider but not necessarily to defer to, Indian religious values." Wilson.
708 F.2d at 747. See also Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act: An Approach To Protecting Native American Religion. 71 Iowa L. Rev. 869 (1986).
320. See S. Rep. No. 709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4; H.R. Rep. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
2-3.
321. 16 U.S.C. §668 (1988).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 87-96.
323. 16 U.S.C. §668a.
324. 50 C.F.R. §22.22 (1988).
325. See supra note 14.
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obtain eagle parts, however, is heavily utilized. In the period from October
1988 through September 1989, for example, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
provided 572 whole eagles, plus many parts, such as wings.' 6 As of
March 1989, 1,007 applications have been approved and are being processed, 825 of which are for entire eagles.327 A federal distribution center
in Ashland, Oregon processes the eagles which die from natural causes
or are confiscated as a result of some illegal activity.
Despite this attempt to accommodate Indian religious needs, the permit
system recently came under constitutional attack. Both the existence of
a permit system and the administration of the system recently have been
held to be impermissible burdens on the free exercise of Indian religious
practices. 3281
The first challenge to the permit system occurred in 1976. United States
v. C. Top Sky 329 involved an appeal of the conviction of a member of the
Chippewa-Cree tribe for selling golden eagles in violation of the Eagle
Protection Act. The defendant argued that the permit system burdened
his free exercise of religion. 3" The Ninth Circuit found this claim rather

disingenuous since the defendant received twenty-one whole eagles through

the permit system, many of which he then sold.33' In addition, the court
found commercial sales to be outside the scope of religious practices. 3"
Ten years later, the debate resumed in United States v. Thirty-Eight
Golden Eagles," 3 a forfeiture action, following charges of selling eagles,

against a member of the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians. Defendant
Adam Norwall argued that the permit system was facially unconstitutional
because it forced Indians to comply with a regulatory scheme in order to
practice their religion. '3 The federal district court concluded that although
the regulatory scheme admittedly interfered with religious practice, wildlife protection interests outweighed the individual interest.'"
In New Mexico, two federal district courts recently concluded that the
M
permit system was unconstitutional. In 1986, in United States v. Abeyta,1 6
326. Of the 572 whole eagles, eighty percent were golden eagles, and twenty percent were bald
eagles. Interview with Mr. K.C. Frederick, Asst. Special Agent, Division of Law Enforcement.
regional office of the Departrnent of the Interior in Albuquerque, October, 1989.
327. Of the 1007. 675 are for whole golden eagles, 150 for whole bald eagles, and 182 are for
eagle parts. Interview with Mr. K.C. Frederick, Mar. 7, 1990. Id.
328. See United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1302-4. 1307 (D.N.M. 1986); United
States v. Hinds. No. 89-46 (D.N.M. order filed Sept. 15, 1989; order vacating filed January 19,
1990) (trial date pending).
329. 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976).
330. Id. at 488.
331. Id. at 487.
332. Id. at 488.
333. 649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nev. 1986).
334. Id. at 274.
335. Id. at 277.
336. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
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the permit system was found impermissibly to burden Indian religious
practices. The court described the permit system as: "utterly offensive
and ultimately ineffectual,""' 7 and the application process as "cumbersome, intrusive and demonstrat[ing] a palpable insensitivity to Indian
religious beliefs.""' The court also found that delays in the process
rendered the permit system ineffective. 39
In granting a motion to dismiss charges of killing a golden eagle in
yiolation of the Eagle Protection Act, the Abeyta court held, inter alia,
that the First Amendment barred prosecution because the government's
interest could be achieved by less burdensome means.' The court concluded that eagle protection measures were unnecessary for golden eagles:
"Since some depradating golden eagles are taken by ranchers for nonreligious purposes, it is plain that some birds could be made available
for religious purposes. '"" This statement contains two fallacies. First,
as a matter of administrative policy, the Department of the Interior stopped
issuing predator permits in 1970.2 Second, the argument that one exception which allows depletion of a protected wildlife population justifies
other exceptions is entirely inconsistent with the purpose of the Eagle
Protection Act.
In 1989, in United States v. Hinds,' a prosecution for selling a golden
eagle in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, another federal district
court made similar findings in granting dismissal. Although the constitutionality of the eagle permit system is discussed at length in both the
Hinds opinion and the parties' pre-trial motions,' the court's finding of
unconstitutionality is clearly dictum. The indictment charged Hinds with
two counts of selling a golden eagle in violation of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, ' which has no statutory permit exemption process. However,
it is the Eagle Protection Act which authorizes statutory exemptions by
permit.' If Hinds had been charged with the possession of a golden
337. Id.at 1307.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.at 1303.
341. Id.at 1307 (emphasis in original).
342. Despite the fact that Dept. of the Interior has legal authorization to issue permits for predatory
killing, they have not issued permits as a matter of administrative policy since 1970. 41 Fed. Reg.
50,355 (Nov. 15, 1976) (reprinting the memorandum of Mar. 5. 1970 from Secretary of the Interior
Walter I. Hickel which established the policy). Interview with K.C. Frederick. Mar. 7,1990,
confirmed that the policy is still in effect. See supra note 327.
343. Hinds, No. 89-46 (D.N.M. 1990).
344. Id.(order vacating Jan. 19, 1990), and see Memorandum Opinion and Order filed Sept.
15, 1989 p. 13-19, Hinds. No. 89-46 (D.N.M. 1990) (six pages of nineteen); Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum InSupport Of Motion To Dismiss, at 10- Il. 14-15. Hinds. No. 89-46 (D.N.M.
1990).
345. Indictment. Hinds, No. 89-49 (D.N.M. 1990).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 321-28.
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eagle under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and he had obtained the eagle
through the permit process pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act, he presumably would have had an affirmative defense. However, the permit
process in no way authorizes any sale of eagles secured by the permit
process, but only the possession of eagles for religious practices."
Curiously, Hinds raised the constitutionality of the permit system after
stating in both a Motion" ' and Amended Motion to Dismiss' that he
was charged with unlawfully possessing a golden eagle. Because he was
not charged with either the killing or possession of an eagle, resolution
of the permit issue was unnecessary. Not only was addressing the issue
unnecessary, but it was also inconsistent with the judicial principle that
the constitutionality of statutes be addressed only as a last resort."
Despite these obstacles, in granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the
federal district court concluded that the Migratory Bird Treaty Act was
unconstitutional because it provides no exceptions for Indian religious
use, and therefore does not adopt the least restrictive means possible."'
Turning to the existing exception of the religious use permit system under
the Eagle Protection Act, the court concluded it constituted unconstitutional government entanglement in religion.352 Three specific objections
to the permit system were listed by the court: first, a "complicated and
time consuming application process;" second, a lack of information about
the manner in which the eagle was killed; and third, a government determination of the "validity of the religious ceremony" in the application
process." '
The validity of the three allegations cited in Hinds to support a finding
of unconstitutionality has yet to be directly determined because both
Abeyta and Hinds involved orders granting motions to dismiss." The
first allegation, that the application process is complex and intrusive, is
contested by Department of Interior officials,355 and to some degree by
the application form itselfss which requires minimal information. The
347. 50C.F.R. §22.22 (1988).
348. Defendant's Motion And Supporting Authorities For Dismissal, Hinds. No. 89-46 (D.N.M.

1990).
349. Defendant's Amended Motion And Supporting Authorities For Dismissal, Hinds, No. 8946 (D.N.M. 1990).

350. Lvng, 485 U.S. at 445.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Memorandum Opinion And Order at 18. Hinds, No. 89-46 (D.N.M. 1990).
Id. at 16-18.
Id. at 16.
United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (1986); Hinds, No. 89-46 (D.N.M. 1990).
K.C. Frederick interview, supra note 327.

356. The "Request To Receive Eagle Parts/Feathers For Use In Religious Ceremonies" requires
seven items: 1) specification of golden or bald eagle, whole or parts, adult or immature, and single
or pair, 2) identification of tribal membership. 3) name of religious ceremony, 4) certification of
tribal membership, 5) certification from a duly authorized official of your religious group that applicant
is authorized to participate in religious ceremonies, 6) location of nearest bus station (for shipping),
and 7) phone number where applicant wants to be notified as to shipping date. Department of the
Interior application form.
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second claim, that Indians are unable to verify how the eagle was killed,
appears indisputable; the issue remains whether there is an alternative.
Finally, the third allegation that the government must approve of a given
ceremony before it will agree to provide eagles, is also disputed. Department of the Interior personnel say they do not investigate the specifics
of any ceremony identified as religious, nor have they ever denied a
permit on that basis."" The two essential requirements, according to
administrators of the permit system, are tribal enrollment, and a signature
of someone attesting that the eagle will be used for religious purposes."'
Although two courts 39 have concluded the permit system is an impermissible free exercise burden, the facts supporting their conclusions
were not proved. At this time no viable alternative is evident. The alternative implied in the opinions 3" is a complete exemption for Indians from
the relevant statutes. Congress did consider, then reject a complete exemption for Indians for two of the three statutes, 36 becuase it would
directly undermine the purposes of the three acts. Furthermore, if Indians
were the only persons legally permitted to kill eagles, there would be
great economic pressure to contribute to the existing illegal market in
eagles.36'
The argument for a complete religious exemption also assumes that
the impact on a species would be de minimus. However, Indian use of
eagles is far from de minimus; the present number of eagle requests from
the unpopular permit system is 1,007.3 Because the permit system is

unpopular, these numbers probably reflect only a fraction of the actual
number of eagles sought by Indians. The Supreme Court in Dion noted
that congressional reports cited the Indian demand for eagle feathers as
one of the threats to the continued survival of the golden eagle which
necessitated passage of the Eagle Protection Act.'
357. K.C. Frederick interview, supra note 327.
358. Id.
359. Abeyta. 632 F. Supp. at 1304; Hinds, Order of Sept. 15, 1989, at 18. No. 89-46 (D.N.M.

1990).
360. The Abeyta court explicitly states that the permit system "is apparently unnecessary as a
conservation measure" because the Dept. of the Interior is approving predator permits. Abeyta, 632
F. Supp. at 1304. Although the court's information is factually incorrect, the implication is that
Indians should be free from any restrictions on killing eagles. The Hinds court similarly dwells on
the imperfections of the permit system without proposing any alternative that would be consistent
with the congressional intent expressed in the Eagle Protection Act. See Hinds, No. 89-46 (D.N.M.

1990.
361. Congressional hearings during debate over both the Eagle Protection Act amendment (adding
golden eagles) and the Endangered Species Act indicate that a blanket exemption for Indian takings

was considered and rejected as being inconsistent with the protection goal of the acts. Hearings,
supra note 132 (Endangered Species Act, explicitly, and Eagle Protection Act by implication, see
Dion. 476 U.S. 734 (1986) see supra.
362. Recent testimony established that golden eagles recently purchased in New Mexico cost five
hundred dollars. See Hinds indictment. No. 89-46 (D.N.M. 1990).
363. K.C. Frederick interview, supra note 327.
364. H.R. Rep. No. 1450, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

lVol. -30

Despite the listed criticisms, the permit system is successful to some
degree as an attempt to accommodate Indian religious use of federally
protected animals, as obvious from the large volume of Indians receiving
eagles. There is little doubt that the permit system has serious flaws, but
some of the administrative problems could be revised by Congress. Alternatively, if the permit system is ultimately held unconstitutional, Congress will be forced again to weigh the respective interests of religious
killing of animals and wildlife protection, and develop other means of
satisfying both interests.

lII. BALANCING CONFLICTING INTERESTS
Indian Religious Interest in Animals
Although animals are important to many religions of the world, they
are particularly important to American Indian religious practices.36' Indian
religions vary from tribe to tribe, but most are characterized by a strong
animist belief that all entities, living and nonliving, have spiritual lives.'
Wild animals are seen as kindred spirits by most tribes, who therefore
deserve a certain respect and consideration. In a study entitled American
Indian Ecology, one historian concluded: "Animals thus were regarded
as closely related to human beings, but also as powerful spirits with

mysterious, separate lives of their own .... and able to help or hurt with
their power."36'

The hunting practices of tribes indicated the high regard that Indian
cultures traditionally had for animals.' Elaborate rituals accompanied
hunting, whether for subsistence or ceremonial purposes. In addition,
some hunting practices reflected a concern for the survival of various

species.'

Among the Papago, for example, "it was not thought right to

kill more than one eagle in one year."'

0

Despite the fact that tribes dep-

ended upon the utilitarian value of animals for survival, their hunting
was constrained by a simultaneous recognition of animals' intrinsic value.
There is considerable irony in the fact that Indian religious practices
are now identified as contributing to depletion of certain species. Indians
share with non-Indians a parallel interest in species preservation, particularly of the animals which are considered sacred. Yet by virtue of the.
growing numbers of Indians, the number of certain animals sought for
religious use has multiplied, and the impact on those species has con365, J. Hughes. supra note 14. at 23 (The Powerful Animals).
366. See R. Nash, supra note 2, at 92.
367. J. Hughes. supra note 14. at 25.

368. Id. at 23.48.
369. Id. at 3542. The Hopi, for example, when they caught a herd of mountain sheep, would
reportedly release one male and one female. Id. at 35.
370. Id. at 36.

Summer 19901

RELIGIOUS KILLNG OF PROTECTED WILDUFE

sequently multiplied. Indians now have simultaneously conflicting interests in short-term freedom to kill federally protected animals, and longterm preservation of species considered sacred. Furthermore, in securing
animals for religious purposes, it is doubtful that individual interests are
even synonymous with collective tribal interests. Tribes may favor some
form of present regulation to ensure to future generations the continued
availability of sacred animals.
Federal Interest in Wildlife Protection
The federal interest in preservation of wildlife is multifaceted. First,
as defined by the Supreme Court, the federal government now acts as
trustee, with the right and duty to protect the public's interest in wildlife. 37 '
As one federal court recently concluded, "such right does not derive from
ownership of resources but from a duty owing to the people."' The.
federal government has increasingly taken that duty seriously, and enacted
a series of progressively more stringent wildlife protection laws.3" 3 As
laws formulated by state representatives, these statutes reflect a broad
public concensus favoring wildlife regulation. 7 4
In the field of wildlife protection, there is an inherent need for both
national and worldwide uniformity. Isolated enforcement of prohibitions
on killing animals will be to little avail if individuals can hunt nearby in
alternative locations. It is also difficult for most individuals to understand
the larger ecological consequences of their actions. Typically, when humans can empathize witl: an animal, they tend to feel more protective of
that animal. 7 This is usually limited to mammals who are cute, beautiful,
or easy to communicate with. A cuddly panda bear or a beautiful leopard
is far more likely to arouse international concern than a less sympathetic
species such as a swamp snake.37 6 Selective preservation carries dangers
of its own, not the least of which is our profound ignorance of the
consequences of any species' extinction on larger ecological chains. 3 "
371. See supra text accompanying notes 49-60; see generally Meyers. Variation On A Theme:
Expanding The Public Trust Doctrine To Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 Envtl. L. 723 (1989).
372. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
373. See generally M. Bean, supra note 62.
374. Kellert, Social And Perceptual Factors In The Preservation Of Animal Species. in The
Preservation Of Species, supra note 2. at 50.
375. Id. The Kellert article included the results of a study measuring public attitudes toward
wildlife protection. When asked "Which of the following endangered species the person would favor
protecting even if it resulted in higher costs for an energy development project?', the results were:
Bald Eagle 89%; Eastern Mountain Lion 73%; Agassiz Trout 71%; American Crocodile 70%. Silverspot Butterfly 64%; Indigo Snake 43%; and the Kauai Wolf Spider 34%. Id. at 55.
376. Id.
377. As Aldo Leopold concluded: "The outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth century
is not television, or radio, but the complexity of the land organism. The last word in ignorance is
the man who says of an animal or plant: 'What good is it?"' Quoted in J. Krutch. The Best Nature
Writing Of Joseph Wood Krutch 320 (1949).
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Some of the most severe consequences of our individual and local perceptions could be overcome by a legislative process which gathers and
incorporates broader information.
A second factor arguing against a laissez-faire wildlife policy is economics. Individual or local economic interests often conflict with wildlife
protection."" Few human beings are willing to relinquish the economic
benefits that a purely utilitarian perspective provides. International efforts
to curb previously unfettered freedom to kill animals for their fur, horns,
or tusks have resulted in widespread poaching and considerable bloodshed." As more animals join the ranks of the threatened or endangered,
the value of their skins, furs, and other body parts increases dramatically.
Even cultures where specific animals are considered sacred often contain
individuals willing to exploit those animals for economic gain. For example, a disturbing number of Indian cases claiming religious exemptions
involving the selling of eagles,' a practice which is offensive to most
Indian religions.-"' The federal government, as trustee of wildlife, has a
strong interest in preventing the decimation of wildlife for economic gain.
The weight of the federal government's interest in wildlife protection
varies according to the circumstances of each species' status. However,
once Congress explicitly identifies a species as warranting protection,
that designation carries great weight. In the case of the golden eagle and
the bald eagle, for example, federal law protects both. The Migratory
Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act protect the golden eagle.3" 2
The same statutes protect the bald eagle, plus the Endangered Species
Act.3" 3 Some courts, in weighing the governmental interest in protecting
golden eagles, as expressed by the Eagle Protection Act, have concluded
that the governmental interest is not compelling because the golden eagle
is not currently endangered.'" This begs the question, since prevention
of endangered status is the entire purpose of wildlife protection. Once
Congress has designated a species as within federal protection, the exact
degree of threat should not be estimated by a court using less comprehensive information. Due to budgetary cuts, neither federal nor state
counts of golden eagles have been made in the last decade.385 Conse378. N. Myers, supra note 7, at 7.
379. See D. Anderson & R. Grove. Conservation in Africa: People, Politics, and Practice (1987).
380. See, e.g., Dion. 476 U.S. 734; L. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 C. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486; Hinds.
No. 89-46 (D.N.M. 1990); Thirty.Eight Golden Eagles. 649 F. Supp. 269.
381. See, e.g.. C. Top Sky 547 F.2d at 488 (the act of selling is deplored by Indian religion).
382. For discussion of the full scope of protection under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, see supra
text accompanying notes 66-80; for the Eagle Protection Act, see supra text accompanying notes
81-105.
383. Supra note 124.
384. Abevia, 632 F. Supp. at 1304.
385. Neither Department of the Interior, nor comparable state agencies have data more recent
than fifteen years ago for golden eagles, according to the Department of the interior, Albuquerque
Regional Office. March 1990.
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quently, there is no statistical information available. Where the status of
a species is not determined, the congressional mandate to prevent further
losses should govern.
CONCLUSION
Taking the life of another living creature is unique among religious
practices. Unlike most religious rituals, it necessarily involves extinguishing another life to further one's own spiritual growth. At one time
human beings did believe that even the sacrifice of other human beings
was justified for religious purposes. 3' However, as most societies came
to believe that all humans have intrinsic rights, human sacrifice ceased.
With increased recognition of the intrinsic value of human beings, many
relationships based upon utilitarian concepts, such as slavery, were relinquished.
Recently, proponents of a new environmental ethic warn that to avoid
a profound global crisis, humans must replace their remaining utilitarian
perspectives with new outlooks of self-restraint and respect for the intrinsic value of non-human entities." In the case of wildlife protection,
both a utilitarian perspective and an intrinsic value perspective support
stringent regulation of the killing of certain animals. The utilitarian view
argueg that the loss of biological diversity through extinction means a
loss of potential resources to humans. The intrinsic view argues that
species have an intrinsic value and should be preserved regardless of their
usefulness to humans. Although both perspectives support wildlife protection, the intrinsic value perspective is incompatible with the concept
of killing animals to satisfy the religious desires of humans. The conflict
between Indian religious practices and federal wildlife protection symbolizes this broader philosophical debate.
Indian killing of animals for religious use has not been the major or
only cause of the dramatic reduction of many species. For example, loss
of habitat, DDT, and high voltage wires have all contributed to declining
eagle populations.388 Yet one of the hardest lessons of our time is that we
do not need to participate in creating a problem to suffer its consequences,
and share the responsibility to remedy it. One does not have to contribute
personally to air pollution, oil spills, or acid rain to have the quality of
one's life degraded, or one's health impaired.
It is an unfortunate reality that although the religious killing of animals
may be done with great respect and gratitude, the result is identical to
killing for other motives. A panther is equally dead whether it is killed
386. For a discussion of the role of human sacrifice in various religions, see 5-6 Encyclopedia
'f Religion & Ethics 840-66 (J. Hastings ed. 1951).
387. Norton. On The inherent Danger Of Undervaluing Species, in The Preservation Of Species,
supra note 2, at 110.37.
388. Dunstan, The Golden Eagle. in Audubon Wildlife Report: 1989-1990 at 507 (1989).
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by a trophy hunter, or killed by an Indian for religious purposes. As the
price for exercising a virtually unrestricted freedom to kill animals for
individual desires, Americans are now witnessing the irreversible loss of
many species. As the human population has increasingly appropriated
wildlife habitat for living, farming, ranching or profit-making, species
are being extinguished daily by some estimates, and that trend is accelerating.' "
To ensure the survival of all species, including our own, we must
reevaluate our relationship to animals which has brought us to this point.
All killing of animals whose numbers are declining should be prohibited.
Current federal wildlife statutes now afford many species approaching
extinction stringent federal protection. Undoubtedly, some Americans
accustomed to unrestricted freedom to kill will resent the restraints forced
upon them by the federal government. However, simultaneously, other
Americans are voluntarily taking measures necessary to restore ecological
integrity. 39e
The free exercise of religious practices is a powerful symbol of individual freedom which Americans value. Yet it pales beside the spector
of the irreversible loss of animals such as the eagle, or the Florida panther.
Unless religious practices involving protected animals can be accommodated by means such as the permit system,"' which do not allow
additional killing, many species will continue to decline. We have reached
a time where individual freedom to seek religious gratification at the
expense of another species may be an individual freedom which we can
no longer afford. The choice is ours.
TINA S. BORADIANSKY

389. N. Myers, supra note 7 at 3-5. Myers warns that although extinctions are soaring, many
go undocumented. The documented rate shows roughly one species per year became extinct by
man's action from 1600-1900. By 1974 it was estimated that the rate may have reached one hundred
a year. Myers estimates that due to widespread habitat loss, the extinction rate could now be exceeding
one hundred a day. Id.. For a discussion of the difficulties in estimating the rate of extinctions, see
Lovejoy, Species Leave The Ark One By One. in The Preservation of the Species, supra note 2. at
13-16.
390. In recent years, for example, people are voluntarily boycotting fur coats, ivory jewelry, and
other animal products to help decrease the market for poachers. Similar actions are beginning for
other resources also, such as recycling and water conservation.
391. The important characteristic of the current permit system is that it secures eagles for individuals without the species suffering additional killings.

